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I. INTRODUCTION

Many commentators believe there is a professionalism "crisis" in
the legal profession today which is evidenced by a perceived decline in
ethical and civil behavior by attorneys.' Those commentators claim that
there is a marked increase in discourteous, uncivil, "Rambo"-like
behavior among lawyers.2 The existence of this crisis is not entirely

1. See, e.g., Louis P. DiLorenzo, Civility and Professionalism, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8, 8

(1992).
2. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 531, 610 (1994); Amy Mashbum, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility

Codes and Bar Hierarchy,28 Val. U. L. Rev. 657, 657-59 (1994); Edward D. Re, The Causes
of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85 (1994); Paul A.
Franzese, Back to the Future: Reclaiming Our Noble Profession, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 488,
494-95 (1994) (reviewing SOL LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION:
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994)). This perceived crisis may be

related to two other problems, which appear to have increased in the last ten to fifteen years.
The first area of concern is a decline in public opinion of lawyers and the legal profession in
general. See, e.g., Peter D. Hart Research Associates, A Survey of Attitudes Nationwide Toward
Lawyers and the Legal System (Jan. 1993) (report prepared for the American Bar Association)
assessing the poor public opinion of lawyers and the legal system; see also John C. Buchanan,
The Demise of Legal Professionalism:Accepting Responsibility and Implementing Change, 28
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uncontroverted? However, little empirical research has been conducted
to determine whether attorneys are indeed behaving less ethically than
they were in the past or whether they are actually exhibiting an
inappropriate level of unethical conduct now. Instead, empirical research
to date has focused on the moral and ethical decisionmaking styles of
attorneys.4 Moreover, the results of these studies often have been
inconsistent.' Some studies find that the moral development of attorneys
differs from that of the general population,6 while other studies find few
significant differences.!
This Article reviews existing research on the moral and ethical
decisionmaking processes of attorneys and of mental health professionals

VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 564-66 (1994) (citing similar statistics); Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi:
The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 63-64 (reporting
statistics on the poor public opinion of attorneys); Raquel A. Rodriguez, Chairperson'sColumn,
Uncivil Litigation,BARRISTER MAG., Summer 1996, at 2,2 (quoting John Marks, The American
Uncivil Wars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 22, 1996, at 69) (" '[L]awyers have become
symbols of everything crass and dishonorable in American public life ..... ' ); see generally
BILL ADLER, FIRST, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS: LEGAL PROVERBS, EPITAPHS, JOKES, AND

ANECDOTES (1994) (one example of several recent books on anti-lawyer sentiment); Jeff Barge,
Fewer ConsiderLaw School: Schools Reporting Applications Declining,A.B.A. J., June 1995,
at 24 (law school applications have declined).
The second area of concern is the increasing mental health problems and dissatisfaction
among lawyers. See, e.g., ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, THE STATE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: 1990, at 52-62, 71-81 (1991) (summarizing the results of the National Survey of
Career Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction Waves I and II conducted by the Young Lawyers Division
in 1984 and 1990); ABA YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, THE STATE OF THE LEGAL PRO'FESSION:
1990-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-3, 11-13 (1992) (same); see also ABA, THE REPORT OF AT THE
BREAKING POINT: A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EMERGING CRISIS IN THE QUALITY OF
LAWYERS' HEALTH AND LIVES-ITS IMPACT ON LAW FIRMS AND CLIENT SERVICES 9-10 (Apr.
5-6, 199 1) [hereinafter BREAKING POINT] (discussing the results of the surveys conducted by the
ABA Young Lawyers Division in 1984 and 1990).
3. See, e.g., Mashburn, supra note 2, at 660-61 (arguing that the "crisis" may be an
artifact of excessive introspection by the legal profession rather than a true phenomenon);
Burnele V. Powell, Lawyer Professionalism as Ordinary Morality, 35 S. TEx. L. REV. 275
(1994). In contrast, however, when discussing the instant study this author often received the
comment that ethical decisionmaking by attorneys constituted an oxymoron or, at the least, that
a paper on the subject would be quite short.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 28-181 (summarizing the research done in this
area).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progressives or Reactionaries:
The Law and Order Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers, 7 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 39, 50-51
(1982) (stating that moral development of most lawyers is different from -that of other adult
groups).
7. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of the
Law Student. Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 357-58 (1981)
(stating that law school education did not significantly change moral reasoning among students).
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and then presents the results of an original empirical study of the
professional ethical decisionmaking processes of attorneys.8 The results
will be compared to the results of similar studies on mental health
professionals and then will be interpreted more generally.
In contrast to past research involving ethical decisionmaking by
mental health professionals,9 the instant study found that attorneys
appear to approach ethical decisionmaking on a case-by-case basis."0
What attorneys reported they should or would do when faced with a
particular professional ethical dilemma, and the reasons for these
decisions, varied according to the particular situation presented."
Lawyers' ethical decisionmaking thus appears to differ somewhat from
that of psychologists and other mental health professionals. 2
In contrast to some past research on the moral decisionmaking
styles of attorneys, 3 the instant study found that attorneys did not rely
on laws, rules, and regulations as the reasons for their decisions more
often than they relied on other rationales. 4 Instead, the rationales
chosen for their decisions also varied depending on the situation. 5 This
study suggests that lawyers' professional ethical decisionmaking may not
be as homogeneous, conventional, or rule-based as some previous
studies suggest.' 6
Finally, in direct opposition to past research with mental health
professionals, 7 what attorneys reported they should do in each situation
was not more conservative or ethical than what they reported they would
do in that situation. 8 They often reported they would do "more" than
they believe they should.'9 This may suggest that attorneys interpret
should as determining the minimum standard of care in ethical dilemmas
rather than the maximum standard or aspirational ideal.2" Indeed,
overall the results of the instant study suggest that attorneys may view

8. This study was motivated in part by a desire to investigate whether empirical evidence
could be gathered to support or controvert the perception of widespread unethical behavior
among lawyers, and in part by a desire to determine whether attorneys reason differently than
do non-lawyers.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 182-90.
10. See infra pt. W.C.2.
11. Id.
12. See infra pt. IV.B.3.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 67-74, 131-42, 146-52.
14. See infra pt. III.D.3.
15. Id.
16. See infra pt. IV.C.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 191-96.
18. See infra pt. IV.D.
19. See infra pt. III.D.4.

20. See infra pt. IV.D.1.
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the legal code of ethics as the minimum acceptable behavior, rather than
as an ideal.21 This suggestion provides support for the argument that
lawyers' ethics codes fail to promote professionalism adequately because
they only outline what should not be done and fail to state what
constitutes the most ethical, professional, or desirable behavior.22
II. ExIsTING RESEARCH

Existing empirical research on the moral and ethical development
and decisionmaking processes of attorneys is somewhat inconsistent.
Some studies suggest that attorneys make moral and ethical decisions
differently than the general population.23 Other studies suggest that
there are no great differences between attorneys and the general
population with respect to moral development.24 Because the number
of female law students has significantly increased in recent years.'
gender differences may be responsible in part for some of the inconsistency, as there is evidence that women's and men's moral reasoning
styles may differ.26 Also, certain law school experiences appear to
affect moral reasoning in different ways.27
A. Moral and Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys
Perhaps in response to the perceived professionalism crisis, much
of the empirical research on lawyers and law students since 1980 has
investigated their moral development and moral reasoning styles.28
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Landwehr, supra note 6, at 50-51. If this is the case, then there may be a
wide gap in understanding and a lack of shared morality between attorneys and the general
public. This would explain in part why the public has such low confidence in lawyers and the
legal profession and tends to view their actions at times as immoral and unethical.
24. See, e.g., Willging & Dunn, supra note 7, at 357-58.
25. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76
MINN. L. REV. 193, 218-33 (1991) (discussing research findings on the distinction between men
and women on care and rights orientation); Janet Taber et al., Project, Gender,Legal Education
and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates,40
STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1249-51 (1988) (discussing the differences in reaction between men and
women to a hypothetical situation).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 98-145; see also Robert Stevens, Law Schools and
Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 593-97 (1973) (discussing the differences in focus at various
law schools and how those focuses have changed over time).
28. Research prior to the 1980s typically focused on their demographic makeup or
personality characteristics. See generally Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of
EmpiricalResearch on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. _
(1997); Stevens, supra note 27 (reviewing the empirical research on attorneys and law students).
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Several of these studies have relied 29primarily on Lawrence Kohlberg's
stage theory of moral development.
1. Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development
Lawrence Kohlberg developed a theory which posits that
individuals' moral development progresses through stages, as the
individual matures. 30 Based on Jean Piaget's stage theory of general
development, Kohlberg proposed six stages of moral reasoning, through
which individuals are theorized to progress in a relatively invariant
sequence from birth to maturity. 3' Kohlberg suggested that progression
through these stages normally occurs throughout life, moving from
relatively immature to increasingly more complex and sophisticated
levels of moral reasoning.32 However, not all individuals reach the
same level of moral development. 33 Most individuals do not reach
Stage 6 but stop developing at Stage 3 or 4. Finally, moral development
ends at various ages for different individuals.34
Kohlberg's six-stage theory has been extensively studied and verified among children, adolescents, and adults in the United States as well
as other countries. 35 Kohlberg's method for assessing a particular
individual's present stage of moral development involves presenting the
individual with a hypothetical ethical dilemma, asking what he or she
would do in the situation, and asking him or her to justify the choice of
action.36 Under this method, an individual's collective responses often
reflect moral reasoning at more than one stage. 37 However, the responses do generally cluster at one stage or another; thus, Kohlberg believes
it is proper to characterize an individual as generally operating at one
of the six stages of moral development.38

29. See infra text accompanying notes 29-66.
30. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 13-14 (1984).
31. Id. at 14-15, 621-24.
32. Id. at 16-18.
33. See id. (stating that Stages 4, 5, and 6 are alternative types of mature response).
34. See id. at 55-59 (stating that Stage 4 is the dominant stage for most adults).
35. Id. at 387-94.
36. See id. 186-95 (discussing the methodology in assessing moral judgment developments).
37. See id. at 186-89 (discussing how to score a mixed stage response).
38. See id. at 172-80 (describing the moral stages).
Other researchers have developed more efficient, paper-and-pencil methods to assess an
individual's "Kohlbergian" stage of moral development. For example, James Rest has developed
a multiple choice test, called the "Defining Issues Test" (DIT). See CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE FOR THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST (Jan. 1993) (on file with James
Rest at the Univ. of Minnesota) (citing numerous publications by James Rest regarding the DIT).
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Kohlberg suggests that, before understanding the six stages, one
should first understand the three moral levels. These are the
preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. Preconventional is
the "level of most children under 9, some adolescents, and many
adolescent and adult criminal offenders."39 This level includes Stages
1 and 2.' Kohlberg refers to Stage 2 as "con-man ideology."' The
conventional level is "the level of most adolescents and adults in our
society and in other societies., 42 This level refers to "conforming to
and upholding the rules and expectations and conventions of society or
authority just because they are society's rules, expectations, or conventions."'43 However, the rules have become internalized at the conventional level, while at the preconventional level, the rules are followed
only because they are externally imposed and enforced." Conventional
reasoning includes Stages 3 and 4.45 The postconventional level is
"reached by a minority of adults" and then usually only after age 20.46
The postconventional individual "understands and basically accepts
society's rules, but acceptance of society's rules is based on formulating
and accepting the general moral principles that underlie these rules."'
At this level, if the rules conflict with these general moral principles, the
principles and not the rules are followed.4 8 The postconventional
individual has "differentiated his or her self from the rules and
expectations of others and defines his or her values in terms of selfchosen principles. 49
Kohlberg's six stages of moral development can be described as
follows. At Stage 1, the HeteronomousMorality orientation, the physical
consequences of an action determine its goodness or badness. 0 One is
motivated to avoid punishment because of the "superior power of
authorities."'" At Stage 2, the Individualism,Instrumental Purpose,and
Exchange orientation, one's own needs are paramount, yet others' needs
are recognized, so right is defined by what's fair in an equal exchange,
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

KOHLBERG, supra note 30, at 172.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 173.

45. Id. at 172.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 173.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 174 tbl. 2.1 (stating that at Stage 1, a person avoids breaking rules backed
by punishment).
51. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss2/1
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deal or agreement (i.e., you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours)."
At Stage 3, the Mutual InterpersonalExpectations, Relationships, and
InterpersonalConformity orientation 3 good behavior is that which has
"good" motives, pleases or helps others, and is approved of by
society.54 The individual conforms to stereotypes of nice, natural, or
majority behavior.5 At Stage 4, the Social System and Conscience
(Law and Order) orientation, laws, rules, and authority are upheld, the
social order and system is maintained, and one's fixed social obligations
are fulfilled. 6 At Stage 5, the Social Contract or Utility and Individual
Rights orientation, law and rules are important, but the individual also
is aware of the relative nature of personal values and rights.5 7 Thus,
"[s]ome nonrelative values and rights like life and liberty.., must be
upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion" or the law. 8
These nonrelative values and rights may conflict with the law and the
individual may find it difficult to integrate them. Stage 5 has been
referred to as the official morality of the American government and the
United States Constitution.5 ' At Stage 6, the Universal Ethical Principles orientation, correct behavior is defined by reference to abstract,
universal, self-chosen ethical principles that transcend society's laws.'
Laws are upheld only if they rest on such principles and do not conflict
with them. Such principles include the concepts of "justice, the

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Landwehr, supra note 6, at 40 n.2 (quoting Lawrence Kohlberg, The CognitiveDevelopmental Approach to Moral Education, in READINGS IN MORAL EDUCATION 50-51 (P.

Scharf ed., 1978)).
55. Id.
56. KOHLBERG, supra note 30, at 175 tbl. 2.1; Landwehr, supra note 6, at 40 n.2 (quoting
Lawrence Kohlberg, The Cognitive-DevelopmentalApproach to Moral Education, in READINGS
IN MORAL EDUCATION 50-51 (P. Scharf ed., 1978)).
57. KOHLBERG, supra note 30, at 175 tbl. 2.1.
58. Id.
59. Landwehr, supra note 6, at 40 n.2 (quoting Lawrence Kohlberg, The CognitiveDevelopmental Approach to Moral Education, in READINGS IN MORAL EDUCATION 50-51 (P.
Scharf ed., 1978)).
Stage 5 can be further subdivided into Stage 5A and Stage 5B.Willging & Dunn, supranote
7, at 322. They described Stage 5A as "normative and utilitarian, with judgments based on
external sources," while Stage 5B was described as an "awareness of rules combined with an
internal evaluation of their fairness." Id. (citing LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, MORAL STAGES AND
MORALIZATION: THE COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENT APPROACH IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND
BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 40-41 (1976)). Thus, an individual's

internal values, as opposed to society's, may become more important in Stage 5B as compared
to Stage 5A.See id.
60. KOHLBERG, supra note 30, at 176 tbl. 2.1.
61. Id. This is sometimes described as the morality of Gandhi.
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equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of human beings
as individual persons."'62
Although Kohlberg's stage theory has been frequently used in
empirical studies of moral development, Kohlberg's theory is not
without its critics. For example, Carol Gilligan has consistently asserted
that Kohlberg's theory of moral development does not adequately
describe women's moral development, and is thus gender-biased.63 She
believes, and has performed empirical research to demonstrate, that
when Kohlberg's theory and methods are applied to women, they
portray women as less morally developed than men.' Gilligan asserts
that women's moral reasoning differs qualitatively from men's, and
Kohlberg's theory and methods do not account for these qualitative
differences.65 As stated above, there is evidence that men and women,
including male and female law students, make moral decisions different-

62. Id. at 176 tbl. 2.1.
In response to the famous "Heinz Dilemma," which asks whether a man should steal a drug
to save his wife's life when he does not have enough money to buy it and the druggist is
charging 10 times its cost and will not negotiate the price, individuals at the various stages could
justify either stealing it or not stealing it. Id. at 640-43. However, their rationales for their
various choices would vary depending on their moral development stage. Id. at 186-88. In this
example, individuals at the various stages would:
Stage 1: Focus on the physical consequences of the act or the size of the theft;
Stage 2: Justify an act based on whether it serves the needs of the individuals
involved;
Stage 3: Evaluate an act based on whether the actor's motives were nice, good, or
altruistic or bad, mean, and selfish;
Stage 4: Decide that an act is always wrong if it violates the law; one must follow
the rules or one's obligations;
Stage 5: Recognize that circumstances justify deviant acts, but do not make the acts
right; the ends do not justify the means; and
Stage 6: Justify an act as "right' if it was done to follow general self-chosen
principles, even if it violates a law. Nice or good motives are not important.
Id. at 49-51 tbl. 1.5 (citing James Rest, Developmental Hierarchy in Preference and Comprehension of Moral Judgment (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1968)).
63. See KOHLBERG, supra note 30, at 338-60 (commenting on and replying to CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT

(1982)).
64. Id. at 341-42 (citing Carol Gilligan et al., Contributions of Women's Thinking to
Developmental Theory: The Elimination of Sex Bias in Moral Development Theory and
Research, Final Report to National Institute of Education (1982). Similar gender differences have
been borne out in studies of law students as well. See Taber et al., supra note 26, at 1248-51;
Janoff, supra note 26, at 224-26.
65. KOHLBERG, supra note 30, at 339-42.
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ly, but the debate among Kohlberg and Gilligan, and others has not been
settled."
2. The Moral Development of Law Students
a. Stage of Moral Development of Law Students
In 1974, Tapp and Levine investigated the moral stage of graduating law students. 7 They used open-ended questions to elicit responses
from students during a general discussion. They reported that law
students' morality differed from that of college students, teachers, and
prison inmates, in that it was consistently more "conventional" and
focused on maintaining social order and conformity.6 9 The term
"conventional" was used as a term of art to distinguish between
Piagetian notions of conventional and postconventional thinking.'
Conventional thinking is described as the type of thinking that relies on
formal rules and moral conventions approved by the majority within the
culture." On the other hand, post-conventional thinking emphasizes
overriding moral principles such as justice, fairness, equality, and social
utility, rather than formal, societal rules.72 Kohlberg's Stages 5 and 6
are typically considered characteristic of postconventional thought, while
conventional thought is associated with earlier, less developed stages
such as Stages 3 and 4.73 Tapp and Levine concluded that the law
students appeared to rely on formal rules and societal conventions more
than other groups and may have exhibited a more homogeneous stage
of moral development within the group than other groups.74
A different conclusion was reached in 1981, when Willging and
Dunn used a different methodology to study law students." They
66. See id. at 349-60.
67. June L. Tapp & Felice J. Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical
Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 n.86 (1974). Subjects were graduating law students in Tapp's
course in 1971. Id.
68. Id. The responses were then scored by reference to a rating scale developed by them.
Id.
69. Id. at 27.
70. See id. at 21-22.
71. Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1
CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 508-11 (1995) (summarizing the Kohlbergian stages of moral
development).
72. Id.
73. Willging & Dunn, supra note 7, at 314, 323.
74. Tapp & Levine, supra note 67, at 30-31. The law students' morality did not
appreciably change during law school, and the researchers concluded that "[p]rofessional legal
education apparently exerts little influence in changing views of the purposes of law." Id. at 25.
75. See Willging & Dunn, supra note 7, at 355.
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concluded that law students were not significantly more or less morally
developed than students in other graduate schools. 6 Willging and Dunn
used Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT) to assess subjects' Kohlbergian
stage of moral development." The DIT is a paper and pencil test which
presents dilemmas and asks the subject to choose a response-an action
choice.7" The DIT then lists 12 arguments and asks the subject to rank
them in order of importance to their decision.79 Each argument represents a moral stage of reasoning." The test then yields a single "P"
score, which corresponds roughly to a Kohlbergian stage."' Prior
empirical studies with the DIT indicate that P scores tend to increase as
the subjects mature, with a leveling-off of the scores after adults leave
an academic environment. 2 The DIT is a simpler method for assessing
stages of moral development than Kohlberg's original method, which
involved a personal interview by a trained interviewer with each subject,
written short essay answers, and a complicated scoring system for the
subject's responses.8 3
Willging and Dunn found that the average P scores of entering law
students were not significantly different from those of graduate students
in other professional schools.8 4 The law students' scores were clustered
in Stages 4 and 5A, with relatively few scores at Stages 2 and 3
reasoning. 5 Willging and Dunn apparently performed no statistical
analysis to determine whether law students' P scores differed significantly than other graduate students' scores; they simply reported the average
P scores for various groups and stated that "there does not appear to be
much difference." 6 Although Willging and Dunn concluded that law
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 348.
82. Id. at 322-23 (citing JAMES REST, DEFINING ISSUES TEST (1972); JAMES REST,
MANUAL FOR SCORING THE DIT at 5-1 to 5-5 (1974)).
83. See Willging & Dunn, supra note 7, at 322 (citing LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, MORAL
STAGES AND MORALIZATION: THE COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH IN MORAL
DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 41-46 (1976))

(comparing Kohlberg's methodology with the DIT).
84. Willging & Dunn, supra note 7,at 356. Subjects were law students at the University
of Toledo during Fall 1976 and Spring 1978. Id. at 345, 351.
85. See id. at 348-50 (comparing the standard scores for law students with "norms from
an original sample").
86. Id. at 350. Also, the P scores did not correlate with grade point average (undergraduate
or law) or Law School Admissions Test scores, which indicates that moral development may be
independent of abilities measured by these variables. Id. at 356-57. However, Willging and Dunn
indicate that others, including Rest, have found correlations between P score and IQ, aptitude,
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students' moral development did not differ from that of other graduate
students, 7 their results were still somewhat consistent with Tapp and
Levine's because they found that law students' moral stage tends to
cluster in a conventional, rule-based, Stage 4 or 5A, Law and Order
orientation.88
b. Effect of Law School on Law Students' Moral Development
Many observers believe that law school has a homogenizing
influence on law students, in that their attitudes, beliefs, and reasoning
styles tend to become more alike than different as a result of law
school.89 Such a homogenization has not been consistently borne out
by empirical studies.' However, there is some empirical evidence
suggesting that law school tends to promote homogeneous moral
decisionmaking by law students; specifically, law school encourages a
rights orientation rather than an ethic of care in making moral judgments.9
Others have suggested that "law school, especially during the stress
of the first year, induces a regression in social and personal values
which might be reflected in a regression on moral development
measures or at least [retarded] growth,"92 as well as "a decline in ethics
and emotional sensitivity."93 Although empirical evidence does not support this assertion entirely, certain attitudes do appear to change during
law school. For example, law students may become more tolerant of
ambiguity, more interested in small firm private practice, and less
interested in pro bono or social reform work.94 There may be move-

and achievement. Id. at 351.
87. Id. at 356.
88. See id. at 350; see also Tapp & Levine, supra note 67, at 30-31.
89. See, e.g., T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 18

(1977).
90. See Daicoff, supra note 28 (forthcoming).
91. See, e.g., Janoff, supra note 26, at 233-34 (discussing the shift in women's reasoning
from a care orientation to a rights orientation after the first year of law school); infra text
accompanying notes 131-42.
92. Willging & Dunn, supra note 7, at 339.
93. Id.
94. Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas A. Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional
School 13 LAW & Soc. 11, 30 (1978); James M. Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education:
An In-Depth Examinationof Career-RelevantInterests, Attitudes, and PersonalityTraits Among
First-YearLaw Students, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 791, 805 n.34, 825 (1979); Craig Kubey, Three
Years of Adjustment: Where Your Ideals Go, JURIS DR., Dec. 1976, at 34; see also Walter
Steele, A Comparison of Attitudes of Freshmen and Senior Law Students, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC.
318, 319 (1970) (finding no significant differences in first- and third-year students with respect
to trust versus cynicism); see generally Daicoff, supra note 28 (forthcoming) (a more complete

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

13

Florida
Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

ment towards increasingly ethical responses to professional ethical
problem situations during law school as well." Other evidence suggests
that some of these changes reverse once the student enters law
practice." For example, in a 1969 study, responses to professional
ethical problems by graduating law students were more ethical than the
responses of practicing attorneys, indicating a regression in professional
ethics during practice.97
Studies of the effect of law school on law students' stage of moral
development have resulted in conflicting findings. For example, Tapp
and Levine in 1974 found that law students' moral reasoning did not
appreciably change during law school.98 Willging and Dunn in 1981
also found no significant differences in law students' "P" scores on the
DIT before and after their first year or before and after a comprehensive
third-year course in ethics.99 However, when the "P" scores were
converted to Kohlbergian stages, there was a trend after the first year for
the frequency of Stage 5B to drop and Stage 5A to increase, suggesting
a slight regression as a result of law school."° This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that law students operate at predominantly a
conventional, Stage 4 or 5A of moral reasoning; however, the result also
suggests that this conventional moral reasoning may be in part a result
of law school.
Other studies conflict with these results. In 1995, Steven Hartwell
repeatedly found dramatic and significant differences in the "P" scores
of law students before and after professional responsibility courses. m t
Hartwell concluded that professional responsibility courses were an
review of the empirical research on the effect of law school on law students).
95. See Wagner P. Thielens, The Influence of the Law School Experience on the
ProfessionalEthics of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL EDUc. 587, 590-91 (1969) (stating that many
entering law students chose ethical responses and that this percentage did increase slightly during
law school). Thielens considered a decision more "ethical" if it conformed to or was in
accordance with the code or rules of professional responsibility for lawyers. Id. at 588.
Disappointedly, the number of unethical responses was substantial, indicating a disparity between
professional ethical norms and their acceptance by law students. See id. at 591. Also, this study
compared law students to practicing attorneys, and found that the percentage of unethical
responses of the lawyers (47.2%) was higher than that of even first-year law students (45.6%),
suggesting a regression in ethics after graduation. Id. tbl. 1. Third-year law students had the
lowest percentage of unethical responses, at 39.2%. Id. at 592 tbl. 2.
96. See id. at 598 (noting the substantial disparity in ethical responses between graduating
law students and practitioners).
97. See id. at 598-99 (stating that one of the reasons for a regression in ethical responses
is probably due "to pressures [sic] from competitive older colleagues").
98. Tapp & Levine, supra note 67, at 25-26.
99. Willging & Dunn, supra note 7, at 348, 352-53.
100. Id. at 349-50.
101. Hartwell, supra note 71, at 524-27.
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effective intervention technique that had a substantial positive effect on
the moral development of law students.'" Hartwell theorized that his
results differed from those of Willging and Dunn because their thirdyear course was "teacher-centered," in which the teacher primarily
presents and dominates classroom material, while his courses were
"student-centered," in which the teacher primarily records and clarifies
student participation and where the students are seeking self-revelation
and self-knowledge rather than offering or defending opinions."m° He
suggested that moral development occurs when students engage in
"moral discourse," because they have a chance to step out of the role of
advocate and arguer and into the role of decisionmakerlt However,
Hartwell's reasoning is not compelling because William Penn taught a
"teacher-centered" undergraduate ethics course that also produced a
significant increase in DIT scores among his students. 5 Hartweil has
suggested that Penn's course was in fact less "teacher-centered" than
reported."
In 1994, Kurt Saunders and Linda Levine also found that law
school changed students in some ways. 7 Saunders and Levine
performed a longitudinal study of eight law students designed to
describe what occurs when one is taught to "think like a lawyer."'08
By the second year of law school, these researchers identified four
effects, or themes, of law school: awareness of the difference between
law school and the real world, loss of idealism about the legal system
and lawyering, increase in tolerance of the role of interpretation and

102. Id. at 527-29. To further verify his results, he administered the DIT to students in five
other experientially taught clinic courses, before and after each course. Id. None of the mean
pre-course DIT scores differed significantly from the mean post-course scores for these five
courses. Id. at 528. Hartwell's results were independent of the manner in which the DIT was
administered and of whether Kohlberg's theory was presented in the course. Id. at 528 nn.77 &
80.
103. Id. at 533. Hartwell hypothesized that the critical feature of his courses was that the
students had an "opportunity to engage in truly 'moral discourse.' " Id. at 530.
104. Id. at 530-32.
105. William Y. Penn, Jr., Teaching Ethics-A DirectApproach, 19 J. MORAL EDUC. 124,
126-28, 136 (1990).
106. See Hartwell, supra note 71, at 534 (stating that "Penn's direct instruction [may have]
entailed a form of experiential work by the students, so that his course was less teachercentered").
107. Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F L.
REV. 121, 180-82 (1994).
108. Id. They began by asking entering law students to illustrate their concept of the law
in a map or diagram and to describe what it means to think like a lawyer. Id. at 144. Eight of
the 94 entering students were re-interviewed about these ideas during their first year and once
in their second year. Id. at 155-80.
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ambiguity, and description of problem-solving methods." However,
they were unable to observe any student fully progress through the
stages of any of the educational models of moral development, including
Kohlberg's."' Furthermore, they observed that the students did not
appear to reason consistently at a particular level; for example, a
student's reasoning might exhibit postconventional thought in one
situation and conventional thought in another."' Thus, their results
suggest that, although law school does have an effect on law students'
thinking, reasoning, and attitudes, it may not always change their stage
of moral development in a measurable amount.' Also, unlike the
findings of previous researchers,"' their results suggest that law
students do not uniformly use one stage of moral reasoning to solve
problems."' This may be in part due to demographic differences in the
makeup of law student populations in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.
Since 1980, the number of women and minority law students has
steadily increased." 5 Female law students may not employ the same
style of moral reasoning employed by male law students."6
c. Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning Through Law School
An extensive survey was conducted of the entire population of law
students enrolled in Stanford Law School (Stanford Study) as of
1986."' This survey was designed to assess gender differences in a
wide variety of areas."' Unlike 1960s and 1970s studies of law

109. Id. at 175-76. The loss of idealism and increase in disillusionment and disenchantment
with the legal system and lawyering occurred even after a summer clerkship experience. Id. at
176-77. These results are consistent with the increasing pragmatism and increasing cynicism
about the legal profession found in law students by James M. Hedegard in 1979. See Hedegard,
supra note 94, at 828-35.
110. Saunders & Levine, supra note 107, at 180. Saunders and Levine found that existing
educational models of learning and development were ill-fitted to describe the changes they
observed in the students, and reported that the short time frame involved in the study prevented
them from observing such progression through the stages. Id. at 180-81.
111. Id. at 180-81.
112. See id. at 181-82 (discussing the shift in the ways law students think as they move
through law school).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 69 & 86.
114. Saunders & Levine, supra note 107, at 181.
115. A.B.A. COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, BASIC FACTS FROM WOMEN IN THE
LAW:

A LOOK

AT THE NUMBERS (1995).

116. See, e.g., Janoff, supra note 26, at 201-03 (stating that a care morality tends to assume
"that others are different from oneself' while a right's morality tends to assume "others are the
same as the self').
117. Taber et al., supra note 26, at 1232.
118. Id.
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students, over forty-five percent of the sample was female." 9 They
found, among other things, support for Gilligan's contention that the
moral reasoning of men and women differ. 20 When presented with
legal hypothetical situations and asked to rate the importance of various
facts to their decisions, women tended more frequently to rate contextual
factors highly while men tended more frequently to rate abstract factors
highly.' Contextual factors are "factors based on relationships, care,
and communication," while abstract factors are "factors relating to
rights, logic, and abstract justice."'" The women's emphasis on
contextual factors is consistent with a style of moral reasoning referred
to as an "ethic of care"'" or "distinct moral voice,"'24 hypothesized
to be characteristic of women, which typically emphasizes interpersonal
concerns." However, not all contextual factors were important to the
women surveyed, perhaps indicating a case-by-case analysis of each
factor or a non-global approach to weighting the factors' importance.126
The authors explain the results by reference to Gilligan's idea that
women's morality focuses on people, which may have caused the
differential weighting of different contextual factors, some of which
were more people-oriented than others." Alternatively, they theorized
that women students and graduates had been sufficiently socialized by
legal training so that they no longer stereotypically considered all
contextual factors or ignored all abstract factors." The authors also
found, contrary to their expectations, that women were not less inclined
to follow legal precedent than men. 29 Perhaps this is due to the
influence of legal training because such training tends to de-emphasize
an ethic of care and rely instead on precedent.' 0
Sandra Janoff in 1989 investigated the effects of law school on the
moral reasoning of female and male law students in a study which

119. Id. at 1230.
120. Id. at 1249.
121. Id. These results were found to be somewhat consistent between two hypothetical
situations presented to the students, one hypothetical involving media law and the other
hypothetical involving the lawof standing. Id. at 1249-51.

122. Id. at 1248.
123. Id. at 1250.
124. Id. at 1248.

125. Id. at 1227.
126. See id. at 1249-50 (discussing the possible reasons why with some contextual factors,
the women's results were the same as the men's).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1250. This latter idea is supported by later research by Sandra Janoff. See infra
text accompanying notes 131-45 (summarizing Janoff's research).
129. Taber et al., supra note 26, at 1250.
130. Id.
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serves as an excellent continuation of the work of the Stanford
Study."' Janoff assessed the moral reasoning of law students enrolled
in Temple University Law School when they first entered law school
and again at the end of their first year. She was particularly interested in whether the gender differences posited by Gilligan, in response to
Kohlberg's research on moral development, existed in her law student
sample, and whether law school affected these gender differences.'33
Janoff considered whether women's moral reasoning would more often
reflect an ethic of care, meaning that women would tend to value
interpersonal harmony, maintaining relationships, people's needs, and
preventing harm."M This approach resolves conflicts by asking what
best maintains relationships, what each person needs, and how to avoid
hurting oneself or another.'35 In contrast, Janoff expected men's moral
reasoning to more often reflect a "rights orientation," which focuses on
rights, rules, standards, individuality, independence, justice, fairness,
objectivity, accomplishments, ambitions, principles, personal beliefs, and
freedom from others' influence. 36 This approach resolves dilemmas
by impartially weighing competing claims and assessing the relative
weight of the positive and negative consequences of a decision.'37
Janoff found her expectations were generally fulfilled. At the
beginning of law school, the majority of female law students studied
displayed an ethic of care orientation, while significantly more male law
students evidenced a rights orientation in moral reasoning.3 Furthermore, there was a significant decrease in the amount of care orientation
and a significant increase in the amount of rights orientation exhibited
by all of the law students from the beginning to the end of the first year
of law school.' 39 Women's care orientation shifted significantly to a

131. Janoff, supra note 26, at 194-96.
132. Id. at 209.
133. Id. at 208-09.
134. Id. at 218-22.
135. Id. at 218-21.
136. Id. at 222-23.
137. Id. at 224.
138. Id. at 217-18, 222. The methods employed were a Sentence Completion Test compiled
from the Washington University Sentence Completion Test, the Real-Life Moral Conflict and
Choice Interview, and a demographic information questionnaire. Id at 211-12. The Sentence
Completion Test and Interview were coded and scored for a care orientation versus a rights
orientation. Id. at 215. Resulting data were then statistically analyzed for significant differences.
Id. at 215-16. While men displayed both orientations, they tended to favor rights orientations
overall. Id. at 224. Janoff explains that the two orientations are not mutually exclusive and the
same individual can express sentiments consistent with both orientations, but generally prefers
one over the other. Id. at 233.

139. Id. at 226.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss2/1

18

Daicoff: (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Stu
ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING BY ATTORNEYS

rights orientation during the first year of law school, but men's rights
orientation did not significantly change."4 From these findings, Janoff
concluded that law students, particularly women, submerge their
orientation towards an ethic of care in order to "align with the rights
assumptions of law school," and that law school tends to silence the
voice of care. 4 ' Further, she hypothesized that law schools' efforts to
teach students to "think like a lawyer" were responsible for the shift
from an ethic of care to a rights orientation because thinking like a
lawyer means focusing on rights and placing oneself in an emotionally
neutral state in order to be an advocate. 42
Therefore, some of the earlier studies of law students' moral
development which found no change in moral reasoning during law
school may conflict with later studies due to the influx of female
students into law schools.'43 Women may initially exhibit a different
moral reasoning style than male students, but may be molded by law
school into a more "masculine" approach."4 Moreover, more recent
studies may reflect a less conventional, homogeneous approach to moral
decisionmaking by law students simply as a result of this change in the
makeup of the law student population. 45 There is, however, still
evidence that law students' moral reasoning is or becomes somewhat

140. Id. at 229-32.
141. Id. at 227. Janoff also concluded that law school "does not incorporate the relational
side of human nature." Id. However, this may be due to law students' pre-existing tendency to
ignore relationships and interpersonal concerns. There is an empirical finding that before they
come to law school, law students prefer the decisionmaking style known as "Thinking" rather
than "Feeling," as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, more than does the general
population. Vernellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator,First Year Law Students and
Performance, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 63, 91 & n.138 (1995); see also Paul V. Miller, Personality
Differences and Student Survival in Law School, 19 J. LEGAL EDuc. 460, 466 (1967) (finding
that Thinking types drop out of law school at a lower rate than Feeling types); Lawrence R.
Richard, Psychological Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing Lawyers in the United
States 229-30 (1994) (stating that lawyers generally prefer Thinking over Feeling) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University). Thus, the fact that legal education ignores relationships
and human issues may simply reflect characteristics of the individuals who make up the law
schools. Richard suggests that preferences for Thinking are fixed personality traits rather than
being situationally-induced attributes. See id. at 230-34 (discussing type theory); see also infra
text accompanying notes 155-58. For an exhaustive discussion of personality characteristics of
lawyers and law students, see generally Daicoff, supra note 28.
142. Janoff, supra note 28, at 228-29.
143. See, e.g., Tapp & Levine, supra note 67; Willging & Dunn, supra note 7. These
studies may have included few women in their samples, due to the demographic makeup of law
school in the 1970s and early 1980s.
144. See, e.g., Taber et al., supra note 28, at 1250; Janoff, supra note 28, at 228.
145. See, e.g., Saunders & Levine, supra note 107, at 181.
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homogeneous and primarily conventional, in the Kohlbergian sense, by
the end of law school.
3. The Moral Development of Lawyers
a. Stage 4 Moral Reasoning Predominantly Used by Lawyers
In 1982, Lawrence Landwehr applied Kohlberg's theory of moral
development and methodology in studying developmental moral stages
of attorneys."4 He found that the responding attorneys were
disproportionately "clustered" at one stage of moral development when
compared with the distribution of the general population. 47 The results
of Landwehr's survey revealed that 90.3% of the responding lawyers
were at Stage 4 and that negligible proportions were at Stage 5 (2.5%)
or Stage 3 (7.2%).'
These findings are in marked contrast to the distribution of adults
that would normally be expected across the six stages." According to
Landwehr, other studies have indicated a basic pattern of 30 to 50% of
adults, including university graduates, in Stage 4 ."5° For example, in
1989 Diomedes Markoulis found that 61% of the university graduates
he studied (secondary schoolteachers) operated at Stage 4, while 39%
operated at Stage 5.5 Similarly, in a 1980 longitudinal study of
undergraduates, almost all of whom received postgraduate degrees,
Murphy and Gilligan found that approximately 65% were predominantly
at Stage 4 and approximately 35% were predominantly at Stage 5.52
When compared, the results of these studies and Landwehr's results
suggest that lawyers' moral reasoning is less developed and more
homogeneous than that of other similarly-educated individuals.

146. Landwehr, supra note 6, at 44-46.
147. Id. at 45 (fig. one). Landwehr used Kohlberg's interview methodology and randomly
chose practicing attorneys in California, Wisconsin, and New York to survey. Id. at 42-43.
Landwehr obtained only 195 responses-a 21% return rate-but he noted that the responding
lawyers did not differ from the nonresponding lawyers on any observable criterion, such as size
of law firm. Id. at 43 n.7. Landwehr's study was likely done without the benefit of Willging and
Dunn's findings, due to the timing of publication of their study. See Willging & Dunn, supra
note 7, at 587.
148. Landwehr, supra note 6, at 44.

149. Id. at 44-46.
150. Id. at 44 & n.8.
151. See Diomedes Markoulis, PosiformalandPostconventionalReasoningin Educationally
Advanced Adults, 150 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 427, 434 (1989) (tbl. 2).
152. John M. Murphy & Carol Gilligan, Moral Development in Late Adolescence and
Adulthood, 23 HuM. DEV. 77, 88-90 (1980). At the end of the study, all but one subject had
degrees beyond the baccalaureate. Id. at 84.
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Landwehr's findings suggest that lawyers make decisions primarily
on the basis of rules, and generally do not make decisions in accordance
with more universal, abstract ideas of right and wrong.'53 In other
words, lawyers can be expected to rely on logic, rationality, rules, and
regulations, rather than on principles of interpersonal harmony or other
values."M This is consistent with a well-established empirical finding
that lawyers and law students exhibit a personality style known as
"Thinking" (rather than "Feeling") much more than does the general
population."' Thinking and Feeling are two exclusive categories on the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, a personality test based partially on Carl
Jung's theories of personality and widely used to assess individual
differences.'56 Thinking and Feeling both represent
rational, valid decision-making methods. Both involve
thought, and neither process is related to emotions....
Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of
Thinking prefer to come to closure in a logical, orderly
manner ... They are excellent problemsolvers. They
review the cause and effect of potential actions before
deciding. Thinkers are often accused of being cold and

153. See Landwehr, supra note 6, at 46 (the majority of lawyers have a cognitive structure
that permits careful scrutiny of whether someone is acting within the rule, but limit the ability
to question the rules themselves).
154. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
155. Randall, supra note 141, at 91 & n.138; Richard, supra note 141, at 229-30; see also
Miller, supra note 141, at 465 (stating that a higher percentage of law students were Thinkers
when compared to undergraduates); Frank L. Natter, The Human Factor: Psychological Type
in Legal Education, 3 RES. IN PSYCHOL. TYPE 55, 61-63 (1981) (stating that in general law
students prefer thinking over feeling). It is also consistent with Janoff's "rights orientation." See
Janoff, supra note 26, at 223 (stating that rights-oriented people tend to stress objectivity and
fairness). For a more exhaustive review of lawyer characteristics, see Daicoff, supra note 28.
156. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator assesses individuals on four dimensions:
Extroversion/Introversion; Intuiting/Sensing; Thinking/Feeling; and Judging/Perceiving. Randall,
supra note 141, at 75-76. Attorneys tended to more often prefer: (1) Introversion; (2) Intuiting;
(3) Thinking; and (4) Judging. Richard, supra note 141, at 230. Lawyers differ from the general
population in that the majority of lawyers prefers Introversion and Intuition, while the majority
of adults prefers Extroversion and Sensing. Id. Additionally, lawyers disproportionately prefer
Thinking and Judging (as opposed to Feeling and Perceiving) compared to most people. Id.
Specifically: (1) about 65% of the general population prefer Extroversion, while 57% of lawyers
prefer Introversion; (2) about 69% of the general population prefer Sensing, while 56% of
lawyers prefer Intuiting; (3) about 61% of all men and 33% of women in the general population
prefer Thinking, while 81% of male lawyers and 66% of female lawyers prefer Thinking; and
(4) about 55% of the general population prefer Judging, while 63% of lawyers prefer Judging.
Richard, supra note 141, at 230. Similar results are also.consistently found with law students.
See Randall, supra note 141, at 79-80, 86-87; Miller, supra note 141, at 464-66.
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somewhat calculatingbecause their decisions do not reflect
their own personal values. They focus on discovering truth,
and they seek justice.
Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of
Feeling apply their own personal values to make choices.
They seek harmony and, therefore, are sensitive to the
effect of their decisions on others.... They seek to do
what is right for 5themselves
and other people and are
7
interested in mercy.
Attorneys' preference for the Thinking style in making decisions
is arguably consistent with a Stage 4 rules and regulations orientation,
which resolves moral dilemmas by reference to objective, rational
analysis of the rules applicable to the problem, rather than by reference
to feelings, needs, values, or interpersonal concerns arguably consistent
with a Stage 3 or 5 orientation.'58 It is also consistent with Janoff's
rights orientation found in most male law students before starting law
school and the majority of law students after the first year of law
school.'5 9 Thus, Landwehr's results can be interpreted as consistent
with some of the studies involving the personality of attorneys and law
students.
However, Landwehr's results are inconsistent with Willging and
Dunn's assertion that law students' moral reasoning does not appreciably
differ from that of other groups." One possible explanation for this
inconsistency is that the Stage 4 lawyers were more likely to respond to
Landwehr's questionnaire. Landwehr argued, however, that Stage 4
individuals should feel no special duty to respond to a mailed questionnaire received from a stranger, because Stage 4 individuals would tend
to respond only to those in authority." Alternatively, his results may
157. Susan J. Bell & Lawrence R. Richard, Anatomy of a Lawyer: Personalityand LongTerm CareerSatisfaction,in Do You REALLY WANT TO BE A LAWYER? 149, 152 (2d ed. 1992)
(compiled by Susan J. Bell) (emphasis added).
158. See Landwehr, supra note 6, at 40 n.2 (referring to Stage 4 as the "law and order
orientation"). If lawyers and the general population approach moral dilemmas as differently as
Landwehr's and Richard's data suggest, it also may explain why laypersons are critical of
lawyers. Id. at 44-46; Richard, supra note 141, at 229-30; see also supra text accompanying

notes 54-56.
159. See Janoff, supra note 26, at 222, 233; supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
160. See Willging & Dunn, supra note 7, at 356; supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
161. Landwehr, supra note 6, at 44 n.9. Another explanation for his results is that the
lawyers believed they should appear to rely on laws, rules, and authority because of their
identities as attorneys, and responded in the way they thought they should. Thus, his results may
reflect a social desirability response bias rather than a valid reflection of what these attorneys
would actually do. However, the fact that this bias does not appear to be present in the studies
involving law students (and that it does not appear to be present in the instant study) makes this
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be unreliable due to a low response rate, or the studies may be
incomparable due to the different methodologies used. His findings are
consistent with Willging and Dunn's if Stage 5A responses in their
study would have been scored as Stage 4 responses in his study, so that
law students' cluster in Stages 4 and 5A corresponds to lawyers'
clustering in Stage 4 under Landwehr's method. 62 Alternatively,
perhaps lawyers' moral development does crystallize at Stage 4, but
only after graduation and entrance into practice. 63 The latter possibility would posit a regression in moral stage and a homogenization of
moral development in attorneys after graduation, a possibility which has
not been investigated.
Additional research is needed to replicate or refute Landwehr's
findings. Research also is needed to determine how the moral development of lawyers compares to law students and to the general population,
particularly now that women make up such a large percentage of the
legal profession. Although the attorney and law student studies do not
unequivocally demonstrate that lawyers' moral reasoning differs from
that of the general population, there is some evidence, corroborated by
other studies of lawyers, that the decisionmaking style of lawyers is
more homogeneous and more focused on objective, rational analysis of
rights than is that of the general population."6
b. The Relationship Between Moral Development
and Moral Behavior
(i) Relationship of moral stage to moral behavior
Landwehr theorized that overt behavior is consistent with a
person's stage of moral development and asserted that lawyers' behavior
would therefore tend to follow law and order, to preserve the status quo,
and to uphold existing laws." However, in 1983, Tsujimoto and
Emmons found that, while a certain Kohlbergian moral stage was
predictive of moral intentions, it predicted actual moral behavior much
less reliably.'6 After studying college students' moral stages, moral
explanation questionable.
162. See Willging & Dunn, supra note 7, at 349, 354 (figs. 1 & 2).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
164. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 141, at 91 & n.138; Richard, supra note 141, at 232-34;
Miller, supra note 141, at 466.
165. Landwehr, supra note 6, at 48-51. This is consistent with Tapp and Levine's findings
of "conventionality" in the moral reasoning of "fledgling law professionals" See Tapp & Levine,

supra note 67, at 27 (finding that 67% reflected a conventional orientation); see also supra text
accompanying notes 67-69.
166. See Richard N. Tsujimoto & Kathy A. Emmons, Predicting Moral Conduct:
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intentions, and actions, Tsujimoto and Emmons found that the students
did not always take the moral actions that they stated they intended to
take. 67 They concluded that moral stage is the major determinant of
the intention to engage in moral conduct, but that other variables are
important in determining whether intentions will translate into moral
conduct.'68 Thus, attorneys' stage of moral development may not
necessarily accurately predict their moral behavior.
(ii) Relationship of self-reported behavior
to actual behavior
Other researchers have found that lawyers' actual behavior often
differs from what attorneys report they do in situations other than in
resolving moral conflicts. For example, in 1985, Robert Meadow and
Carrie Menkel-Meadow found that how legal services lawyers described
their approach to cases differed from the lawyering tasks they actually
performed, indicating a discrepancy between lawyers' perceptions of
their work and their actual activities." In investigating legal services
attorneys' perception of their autonomy from rules and regulations,
Meadow and Menkel-Meadow compared attorneys' perceptions to the

Kohlberg's and Hogan's Theories, 115 J. PSY. 241, 243-44 (1983) (theorizing instead that the
ego strength of a person determined whether the conduct of that person would actually follow
the person's moral intentions).
167. Id. at 242-44.
168. Id. at 243-44. Specifically, these researchers assessed the Kohlbergian moral stage of
college students using Rest's DIT and also assessed the students based on another theory,
Hogan's theory of moral development. Id. at 242 (referencing R. Hogan, Moral Conduct and
Moral Character:A PsychologicalPerspective, 79 PSYCHOL. BULL. 217 (1973)). Then, they
asked the students to volunteer to stuff envelopes for a charity and assessed moral behavior by
whether or not the students who volunteered actually "showed up" for the envelope-stuffing.
Tsujimoto & Emmons, supra note 166, at 242. They found that Kohlberg's Stage 5A and
Hogan's autonomy dimension correlated positively and significantly with showing up. Id. at 24344. They determined that combining Kohlberg's and Hogan's measures predicted showing up
better than did either theory alone. Id. However, they also interpreted their findings as supporting
Krebs and Kohlberg's claim that "moral judgment stage is the major determinant of the intention
to engage in moral conduct," but that "ego strength variables are important determinants of
whether intentions are actually translated into moral conduct." Id. at 243-44 (referencing R.
Krebs & L. Kohlberg, Moral Judgment and Ego Controls As Determinants of Resistance to
Cheating (unpublished manuscript, Harvard University 1973)); see also Leonard J. Haas et al.,
Personaland ProfessionalCharacteristicsas Factorsin Psychologists' EthicalDecisionMaking,
19 PROF. PSYCHOL. Rs. & PRAC. 35, 39 (1988) (citing A. Blasi, BridgingMoral Cognitionand
Moral Action: A Critical Review of the Literature, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 (1980)) (noting the
"nonequivalence of moral reasoning and moral behavior" on logical and empirical grounds).
169. Robert G. Meadow & Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Personalizedor BureaucratizedJustice
in Legal Services: Resolving SociologicalAmbivalence in the Delivery of LegalAidfor the Poor,
9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 397, 403-09 (1985).
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lawyers' timesheets which recorded their daily tasks. 7 ° They found
that attorneys often claimed that they worked hardest on the most
interesting cases and that they maintained independence in their
work.' Yet, the attorneys' timesheets revealed that they worked
constantly on cases that were up against deadlines, indicating that they
had less control over their work than they believed."7
Similarly, Lawrence Galie in 1978 cited a study finding that civil
commitment lawyers' descriptions of their lawyering style often did not
match their actual behavior. 3 Civil commitment lawyers are lawyers
who represent individuals recommended for involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization. 74 These lawyers are usually categorized as either
adversary lawyers, meaning they vigorously represent their clients and
actively oppose hospitalization, or best interest lawyers, meaning they
personally weigh the available evidence and decide whether hospitalization is in the best interest of the client, and if it is, they tend to allow
the client to be hospitalized at the hearing. 75 This study surveyed
approximately 100 attorneys and found that they were almost evenly
divided in describing themselves as "adversary" or "best interest"
attorneys. 76 However, subsequent observation of civil commitment
hearings in which these attorneys represented clients revealed that the
overwhelming majority of these attorneys functioned as best interest
lawyers in practice because they tended not to strenuously oppose their
client's commitment to a mental institution if they believed commitment
was in the client's best interests."7 Civil commitment lawyers are
faced with an ethical dilemma, having to choose between their duty to
vigorously represent their clients and their desire to act in the clients'

170. Id. at 402.
171. Id. at 408.
172. Id. at 407-09. They concluded that legal services attorneys do have some measure of

autonomy, although it may not be over the types of tasks they think they have control over. Id.
at 409-10. Instead, it may reside "in the highly personalized ways in which attorneys deliver
their services[,] ... not so much in what they perform or who their clients are, but how they
choose to perform" their tasks. Id. at 411-12. Apparently, bureaucratic pressures and clients'
demands play a large role in determining what the lawyers actually do. Id. at 409-10.
173. Lawrence P. Galie, An Essay on the Civil Commitment Lawyer: Or How I Learned
to Hate the Adversary System, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71, 78 n.6 (1978) (citing a "forthcoming"
1978 publication by the University of Pittsburgh Law Review, at 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. _
(1978)). However, the study does not appear to have been published in volumes 39, 40, or 41
of that law review.
174. Galie, supra note 173, at 74.
175. See id. at 76-77 (discussing the ethical dilemma between acting as adversary counsel
and acting in the best interests of the client).
176. Id. at 78.

177. Id.
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best interests.' Galie's discussion of attorneys' behavior suggests that,
in an ethical dilemma, lawyers
would do something different from what
179
do.
should
they
say
.they
Research by Meadow and Menkel-Meadow and described by Galie
indicates that what attorneys actually do is often different from what
attorneys report they do.80 Thus, with respect to attorneys' resolution
of ethical dilemmas, what they actually would do might differ from
what they say they would do.'
B. Ethical Decisionmaking by Mental Health Professionals
1. Differences in What They Report They
"Should" and "Would" Do
Ethical decisionmaking by mental health professionals has been
fairly well-investigated, in contrast to that of lawyers, and thus may
serve as a basis for comparison. Recent research regarding ethical
decisionmaking by mental health professionals revealed that there is a
consistent discrepancy between what psychologists and other mental
health professionals report they should do and what they report they
would do in hypothetical ethical dilemmas.' Specifically, what they
report they should do is consistently more restrictive ethically or
requires more direct action than what they report they would do if
actually faced with the situation.'

178. Id.
179. See id. at 76-77.
180. Galie, supra note 173, at 78; Meadow & Menkel-Meadow, supra note 169, at 407-09.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 169-77.
182. See, e.g., J.L. Bernard et al., The Failure of Clinical Psychologists to Apply
UnderstoodEthical Principles,18 PROF. PSYCHOL. REs. & PRAC. 489, 491 (1987) (stating that
"significant numbers of clinical psychologists would not do as much as they said they ethically
should"); J.L. Bernard & Carmen S. Jara, The Failureof ClinicalPsychology GraduateStudents
to Apply Understood Ethical Principles, 17 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAc. 313, 315 (1986)
(finding that psychology graduate students would not always do as much as they said they
should); Todd S. Smith et al., Clinical Ethical Decision Making: An Investigation of the
Rationales Used to Justify Doing Less than One Believes One Should, 22 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES.
& PRAc. 235, 238 (1991) (finding a "discrepancy between what clinicians know to be the
[ethical] course of action.., and their stated willingness to implement this [course of action]");
Margaret A. Wilkins et al.,
Willingness to Apply UnderstoodEthical Principles,46 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 539, 544 (1990) ("Clinicians indicated that they would be unwilling to follow through
in response to [an] ethical violation to the same degree that they previously had indicated they
should.").
183. See Smith et al., supra note 182, at 238 (confirming the findings of previous
researchers).
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For example, in 1986, Bernard and Jara found that half of the
clinical psychology graduate students they surveyed would not do as
much as the students thought they should regarding a peer's clear
violation of an American Psychological Association ethical principle."'
In a 1987 study, Bernard and his colleagues found that 26% to 37% of
practicing clinical psychologists would do less than they thought
necessary regarding a colleague's clear violation of an ethical principle."8 5 In both studies, only a minute percentage of the subjects
reported that he or she would do more than he or she thought should be
done. 18 6 In 1990, Smith and his colleagues presented mental health
professionals with a wide variety of professional ethical dilemmas,
including, but not limited to a colleague's misconduct.' They found
that mental health professionals' "should" choices were more consistent
with American Psychological Association principles than were their
"would" choices.' Finally, in 1990, Wilkins and her colleagues found

184. Bernard & Jara, supra note 182, at 314-15. The researchers described this as
"[amounting] to saying, 'I know what I should do as an ethical psychologist, but I wouldn't do
it.' " Id. at 315. The subjects were clinical psychology graduate students from five randomly
selected schools across the United States. Id. at 313. The researchers used dilemmas that
involved reporting a colleague's clear violation of an ethical principle either through a prohibited
sexual relationship with a client or a drinking/alcoholism problem that impaired judgment and
behavior. Id. at 313-14. The researchers concluded that perhaps willingness to take action when
a colleague is engaging in an ethical violation cannot be taught and that ethical codes may not
provide adequate guidance to psychologists. Id. at 315.
185. Bernard et al., supra note 182, at 490. The different percentages were due to the two
different dilemmas presented. The dilemmas used were the same dilemmas used by Bernard and
Jam in their study of psychology graduate students. Id.; see supra note 182, at 313-14. The
researchers found the 25% particularly surprising, given that the drinking/alcoholism dilemma
related to a situation which the psychologists' ethical code describes as flatly unethical. Bernard
et al., supra note 182, at 491.
186. See Bernard et al., supra note 182, at 490 (stating that only 3 subjects out of 250 said
they would do more than they felt they should); Bernard & Jam, supra note 182, at 314 (finding
no instances where a subject said he or she would do more than he or she felt he or she should).
187. Smith et al., supra note 182, at 236-37.
188. Id. at 237-38. The Smith study is the most similar to the instant study in method. Cf.
infra app. A. These researchers presented randomly selected mental health professionals in a 3county area with a questionnaire presenting 10 professional ethical dilemma vignettes, drawn
from actual practice. Smith et al., supra note 182, at 236. The questionnaires were multiple
choice, presenting "response options," basically action choices for each vignette. Id. at 36-37.
Response options that were the "most congruent with [American Psychological Association]
principles received the highest score." Id. at 236. In each vignette, subjects "indicated which
behavioral action best reflected what they believe they should do in the situation, and which
action choice they probably would do if actually faced with such a situation." Id. They reported
that "the total ethical choice score.., for should choices was significantly higher than for would
choices," meaning that "[s hould choices generally reflected more direct, severe, conservative,
or protective behavior than would choices." Id. at 237.
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that among clinical psychologists faced with an ethical violation by
themselves or a close colleague, the "should" choices were significantly
more restrictive and ethical on the average than were the "would"
choices."8 9
These studies did not investigate whether mental health
professionals' actual behavior differed from what they said they should
or would do in an ethical dilemma; rather, these studies consistently
found that what mental health professionals said they should do was
generally more ethical, direct, severe, or conservative than what they
said they would do."9
2. Studies of Their Rationales for Ethical Decisions
Researchers extended the foregoing research with mental health
professionals by investigating the bases for ethical decisions made by
mental health professionals. In 1988, Haas, Malouf, and Mayerson found
that psychologists' more restrictive, more direct choices were more
frequently based on codified reasons, such as upholding a law or an
ethical code, while their less restrictive, less direct choices were based
on noncodified reasons, such as personal standards or protecting
society's and clients' interests. 9 ' They described the codified-

189. Wilkins et al., supra note 182, at 541-43. Subjects in this study were randomly
selected psychologists across the United States. Id. at 540. They were presented with four ethical
dilemmas, and the identity of the person engaged in the ethical violation was variable, including
self, good friend, colleague, and acquaintance. Id. at 541. Regardless of who was presented as
engaging in the ethical violation in the dilemma, the psychologists' should choices were more
ethical than were their would choices. Id. at 543. This suggests that the findings of Bernard and
Jara (1986) and Bernard et al. (1987) were not particular to situations involving reporting a
colleague's misconduct. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. The dilemmas used by
Wilkins and her colleagues were similar to two used by Bernard and his colleagues: sexual
relationship with a client and problem drinking/alcoholism. Wilkins et al., supra note 182, at
541. Two other dilemmas, involving confidentiality and need for referral because of limits in
competency, were selected because of the frequency of complaints to the American Psychological Association in those areas. Id. at 541.
190. See supra note 182.
191. Leonard J. Haas et al., Personal and Professional Characteristicsas Factors in
Psychologists' Ethical Decision Making, 19 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 35, 40 (1988).
Subjects in this study consisted of 294 randomly selected psychologists across the United States,
who were presented with ten professional ethical dilemmas and asked to choose a course of
action from alternatives presented. Id. at 36. Then, they were asked to choose the reason for
their choice from eight reasons representing "three general categories of moral reasons: those
based on adherences to codified standards (upholding the law, upholding the code of ethics),
those based on adherence to noncodified ideals (protecting society's interests, protecting client's
rights, upholding personal standards, safeguarding the therapy process), and a prudence or
'survival' reason (financial considerations)." Id. However, the prudence/survival reason was so
infrequently chosen that it was ultimately eliminated from the analysis of their data. Id. at 37.
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noncodified dichotomy as representing "two fundamental aspects of
fundamental reasoning; that is, one can make a decision to act in a
particular way either because the rules indicate the correctness of this
action or because one's own personal standards indicate this to be the
correct response.... .""9 They defined codified reasons as "based on
written standards or laws" and noncodified reasons as "based on social
ideals or personal standards."' 93 Consistent with this study, in 1991,
Smith and his colleagues found that, when faced with hypothetical
ethical dilemmas, mental health professionals' "should" choices were
more restrictive and were more frequently based on codified reasons,
while their "would" choices were less restrictive and were based on
codified and noncodified reasons equally often. 94 More restrictive,
more ethical choices were more often based on upholding the law or a
code of ethics, while less restrictive, less ethical choices were based on
personal standards or other interests.' This suggests that laws and
ethics codes for mental health professionals provide a higher standard
for conduct than do mental health professionals' personal values.1"
C. Hypotheses About Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys
Reasoning by analogy, previous research involving mental health
professionals suggests several hypotheses with respect to attorneys. First,
Haas and his colleagues found that for five of the ten vignettes, more direct, ethical action was
significantly associated with codified reasons, thus indirectly suggesting that perhaps reliance
on codified/noncodified rationales may vary depending on the situation. Id. at 40.
192. Id. at 36.
193. Id. at 39 (note to tbl. 3).
194. Smith et al., supra note 182, at 237-38; see supra note 188 and accompanying text.
However, these researchers further subdivided their ethical dilemmas into two categories: legal
and nonlegal. Smith et al., supra note 182, at 237. Legal dilemmas involved situations in which
the law required the psychologists to take specific action, such as "sex with client, Tarasoff
situation, child abuse reporting, parental right to know about illicit drug use, and insurance
fraud," while nonlegal situations involved "inappropriate referral, unprofessional product
endorsement, privacy issue with couples, competency limits, and bartering for services." Id. at
237. For legal dilemmas, both should and would choices were more often based on codified
rationales. Id. at 238. For nonlegal dilemmas, should choices were more frequently based on
codified rationales and would choices were more frequently based on noncodified rationales. Id.
This suggests a different approach depending on whether there is a possibility of judicial scrutiny
of one's actions in the situation. In this study, codified rationales were: "(a) upholding the law;
(b) upholding a code of ethics [and noncodified rationales were:] (c) unable to identify a specific
reason/it just feels right (intuition); (d) upholding personal moral values/standards; (e) financial
need; (f) fear of legal reprisal (malpractice action); (g) fear of verbal/social reprisal by
supervisor, colleague, or client; or (h) protection of personal/professional reputation." Id. at 236.
195. Smith et al., supra note 182, at 638.
196. See id. (stating that a clinician violates a professional code primarily when there is a
conflict between the code and the clinician's personal values).
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if attorneys respond similarly to mental health professionals when
presented with hypothetical professional ethical dilemmas, then
attorneys' "should" choices are likely to be more restrictive and more
frequently based on "codified" reasons than on "noncodified" reasons
than are their "would" choices. Second, if Landwehr's results are true
of lawyers in general, then all choices made by attorneys are likely to
be more frequently justified by codified reasons than by noncodified
reasons, due to attorneys' predominantly Law and Order 97 or conventional 9 ' orientation. The instant study was conceived to test these
hypotheses.
This study investigated what attorneys say they should do and what
they say they would do when faced with several hypothetical dilemmas
involving ethical issues specific to the practice of law. This study also
investigated the attorneys' reasons for those "should" and "would"
choices. It was hypothesized that:
1. There would be a significant difference between the "should"
solutions and the "would" solutions chosen by lawyers in response to
ethical dilemmas, and that, on the average, their "should" choices would
be significantly more restrictive or more ethical than their "would"
choices.' Attorneys were expected to report that they "would" do less
than they report they "should" do in such situations." °
2. Overall, lawyers' chosen solutions to ethical dilemmas would
more frequently be based on codified rationales as opposed to
noncodified rationales, consistent with Landwehr's finding that lawyers
primarily rely on laws, rules, and regulations in decisionmaking. °'
3. Overall, the chosen solutions that were based on codified
rationales would be more restrictive or more ethical than those based on
noncodified rationales, consistent with the study conducted by Haas and
his colleagues.2"
Replicating prior research on the ethical decisionmaking of mental
health professionals, with attorneys as the subjects instead, seemed to be
an interesting and feasible study. Further, given the current emphasis on
professionalism and ethics in the legal profession, it appeared important
and relevant to perform an empirical assessment of the ethical
decisionmaking processes of attorneys.'
Finally, in contrast to
previous empirical studies of attorneys and law students, adequate prior
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Landwehr, supra note 6, at 40 n.2, 50-51.
Tapp & Levine, supra note 67, at 21-22; see supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
See supra text accompanying notes 191-96.
See supra text accompanying notes 182-90.
See Landwehr, supra note 6, at 50-51.
Haas et al., supra note 191, at 40.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
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research had been done in the area, albeit with a different profession, so
that the proposed study was more an extension of prior research than a
de novo undertaking.' This previous research served as an ample
basis for comparison and provided a context in which to interpret the
results, thus enabling assessment of whether lawyers differ from other
populations rather than simple reporting of the results.
IM. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ETHICAL
DECISIONMAKING BY ATrORNEYS

An empirical study was conceived and conducted, in which
attorneys in Orange County, Florida were asked to complete an
anonymous, multiple-choice questionnaire containing five professional
ethical dilemmas. Each dilemma presented a professional ethical
problem and offered several "action choices." The questionnaire asked
the attorneys to select one action choice and then asked them to choose
the basis for their decision from four reasons. Two of the reasons were
"codified" rationales (i.e., based on the ethics code or on the law), and
two reasons were "noncodified" (i.e., based on personal values, intuition,
or undetermined). Half of the attorneys received questionnaires asking
them what they should do if faced with the situation in their law
practice, while half received questionnaires asking what they would do.
By this methodological design, the should/would discrepancy discovered
in the research involving mental health professionals was investigated
in a different way than it had been in the past. Prior research with
mental health professionals asked in the same questionnaire what each
subject would do versus what he or she should do. 5 Thus, the
subjects in prior situations were aware that there could be a difference
between what they reported they should and would do. The attorneys
were not alerted to this possibility.'

204. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Bernard & Jara, supra note 182, at 313-14.
206. Methodologically speaking, in the instant study the should/would variable was studied
as a "between-subjects" variable, while in the previous mental health studies, it was studied as
a "within-subjects" variable. The difference is that by alerting a subject to the potential for a
should/would discrepancy, the subject may then expect one or think the researcher is looking
for one. Thus, the researcher has artificially created one. A between-subjects design eliminates
the possibility that the subject develops an expectation of such a discrepancy and thereby reports
one; thus, any should/would discrepancy found using a between-subjects design arguably
deserves more confidence due to this lack of expectancy or bias.
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A. Subjects
Ethical dilemma questionnaires were initially mailed to a random
sample of 250 members of the Orange County Bar Association in
Orange County, Florida in 1991. Based on the response rate to this
sampling, it was determined that questionnaires would be mailed to an
additional random sample of 150 members of this bar association (for
a total of 400 attorneys). The total membership of the Orange County
Bar Association was approximately 1800; almost all of the practicing
attorneys in Orange County belonged to this voluntary association.
B. Materials
Two different questionnaires were used, each presenting the same
five hypothetical ethical dilemmas. One questionnaire asked the
attorneys to choose, from several choices for action, what they should
do in each case (the "should" questionnaire) and the other questionnaire
asked them to choose from several choices what they would do in each
case (the "would" questionnaire). Both questionnaires also asked the
attorneys to choose, from four different rationales, the rationale that best
described their reasons for making each action choice. The four
rationales for the attorneys' choices were separated into two categories;
two were codified rationales, and two were noncodified rationales.
Codified rationales were based on adherence to rules and regulations; for
example, following the dictates of law or a provision of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar (the legal code of ethics in effect in Florida
at the time). Noncodified rationales were reasons for decisions based on
concepts other than rules and regulations, such as personal values or
standards, but also included "unable to identify a specific reason and/or
intuition (i.e., it feels right)."
The ethical dilemmas chosen were based on reported disciplinary
actions against attorneys," as well as on hypothetical ethical dilemmas presented in written and videotaped educational materials prepared
by the American Bar Association. 8 Because the dilemmas were based

207. Ala. St. Bar Disciplinary Comm., Formal Op. 89-81 (1989) as cited in Law. Manual
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 339 (Aug. 7, 1989); Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics,
Informal Op. 89-21 (1989) as cited in Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 310 (July
29, 1989) (later highlighted in Joanne Pitulla, Firm Commitments: Lawyers CannotIgnore Duty
to Report Ethics Violations by Colleagues, 81 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 108); Md. State Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 89-61 (1989) as cited in Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 338-39 (Sept. 21, 1989).
208. ABA Special Coord. Comm. on Professionalism, EthicalDilemmas and Professionalism: A Study for the Video Program (1990) (available from the American Bar Association,
Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism, Center for Professional Responsibility, 541
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on actual cases or on dilemmas deemed significant by the American Bar
Association, they represented significant current legal ethical issues. The
five dilemmas were: (a) referral (client's problem is outside the
attorney's area of expertise), (b) conflict of interest (representation of
former and present clients may create a conflict of interest), (c)
disqualification and misuse of confidential information (attorney must
decide whether to stop representing a client due to a conflict of interest
or create a "Chinese Wall"), (d) dishonest client (on the day before trial,
the attorney learns the client has been lying and may perjure himself),
and (e) reporting a colleague's malfeasance (attorney must decide
whether to report a former law partner's client neglect and ethical
misconduct to the appropriate authorities).2° The full text of the
"should" questionnaire can be found in Appendix A."'
C. Design and Procedure
Each attorney received one questionnaire, along with a cover letter
explaining the study and requesting participation. To maximize return
rate, a one-dollar bill was included with each questionnaire."
Subjects were randomly divided into two groups; one-half of the
attorneys received the "should" questionnaire and the other half received
the "would" questionnaire."' The questionnaires were completely
anonymous and relatively brief, in order to maximize return rate.

North Fairbanks Court, Chicago IL 60611-34 (1990)).
209. Precise citations to those provisions of RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, in
FLA. BJ., Sept. 1996, at 564; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; and MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, which each dilemma was designed to involve are found in
Appendix B.
210. The "should" and "would" questionnaires were identical except that the word "should"
was replaced with the word "would" and vice versa, thus, only one questionnaire has been
provided in the Appendices.
211. This was done to avoid the low response rate in Landwehr's study. See Landwehr,
supra note 6, at 43 (21% response rate). The methodological soundness of this procedure is
supported by a 1990 study demonstrating a dramatic positive effect of financial compensation
on response rate. A.Y. Williams, Survey Return Rate as a Function of Personalization of Cover
Letters and Monetary Incentives (1990) (unpublished M. thesis, University of Central Florida
(Orlando)).
212. As stated above, the should-would variable was studied between subjects, to eliminate
any bias resulting from attorneys' expectancy that their should and would choices should differ
or be the same. The should-would variable has been previously studied only as a within-subjects
variable. The results of this between-subjects study may assist researchers in suggesting direction
for further research to determine if the previously-found discrepancy between "should" and
"would" choices is a result of the research methods or actually of the subjects' ethical
decisionmaking processes.
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Unbeknownst to the attorneys, numerical values ("restrictiveness
ratings") were assigned to each choice for action provided on the
questionnaire, with the highest value assigned to the choice which was
most consistent with the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and zero
assigned to the ethical choice which was least consistent with these
Rules. For example, if three choices were provided, a restrictiveness
rating of two was assigned to the most ethical choice, a rating of one
was assigned to the next most ethical choice, and a rating of zero was
assigned to the least ethical choice. Choices which were equally
restrictive or ethical were assigned the same restrictiveness rating (same
value). An explanation of the restrictiveness ratings assigned to each
action choice in each dilemma can be found in Appendix B.
D. Results
Of the 400 questionnaires mailed, 8.25% (33) were undeliverable.
Of the 367 delivered questionnaires, 69.2% (254) were returned by the
attorneys and 57.8% (212) were usable.2"3 Of the 212 usable questionnaires, 109 were "would" questionnaires, and 103 were "should"
questionnaires. One hundred of the 254 responding attorneys, or 39.4%
of those who responded at all, sent back the dollar bill. All data received
were used in the data analyses, meaning that partially completed
questionnaires were included, to the extent possible, in vignette-byvignette analyses of the data.
1. Statistical Methods Used
In testing the first and third hypotheses of this study, two-way
mixed analyses of variance were done for each vignette. 14 It was
necessary to perform these analyses of variance on a vignette-byvignette basis because the ranges of values for the dependent variable
varied across vignettes. For example, the ethical restrictiveness ratings
of Vignette l's four action choices ranged from 0 to 3 while the ratings
of Vignette 2's two action choices ranged from 0 to 1. Therefore the

213. Of these 254 responses, 212 included completed or partially completed questionnaires
(constituting a 57.8% usable response rate to the questionnaire), 33 returned blank questionnaires, and nine returned only the dollar bill included as a good will gesture, without the
questionnaire. One subject returned the dollar bill and expressed the belief that the dollar bill
was indeed the real focus of the study and that the questionnaire was a ruse.
214. The should versus would condition was the first independent variable (between
subjects); codified versus noncodified rationales was the second independent variable (within
subjects); and the ethical restrictiveness ratings of the action choices selected was the dependent
variable.
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restrictiveness ratings from the vignettes were incomparable and could
not be combined.
2. Hypothesis 1: Were Should Choices More
Ethical or Restrictive than Would Choices?
Results varied from vignette to vignette. There were no significant
differences in the restrictiveness of the should and would action choices
for Vignettes 1, 2, and 4, while the would choices were significantly
more ethical or restrictive than the should choices for Vignettes 3 and
5. The results for Vignettes 3 and 5 thus were the exact opposite of the
hypothesis. The attorneys indicated that what they would do in these
two situations would be more ethical or restrictive than what they
believed they should do.
3. Hypothesis 2: Did Lawyers Rely on Codified Rationales
More Frequently than Noncodified Rationales?
Chi-square goodness of fit analyses for each vignette were used to
determine the frequency with which codified versus noncodified
rationales were chosen, for purposes of testing the second hypothesis of
this study. Across all vignettes, there was no significant difference in the
frequency with which codified rationales were chosen as compared to
noncodified rationales.215 However, results again varied from vignette
to vignette, suggesting a case-by-case approach to the dilemmas. Significant differences appeared for four of five vignettes when they were
analyzed separately.
For Vignettes 1 and 5, significantly more attorneys relied on
noncodified rationales instead of codified rationales. 216 For Vignettes
2 and 4, significantly more attorneys chose codified rationales than
chose noncodified rationales.217 In Vignette 3, codified and
noncodified
218
rationales were chosen with exactly the same frequency.
Additional chi-square analyses of the four rationales chosen
(identified as "A," "B," "C," and "D" on the questionnaires, see
Appendix A) revealed that rationales "B" (based on the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar) and "C" (based on personal values and/or
215. f= 496 for both codified rationales and noncodified rationales.
216. Vignette l:f= 137 for noncodified rationales andf= 60 for codified rationales, X2(l,
N = 197) = 29.32, p = .000. Vignette 5: f = 114 for noncodified rationales and f = 82 for
codified rationales, X2(l, N = 196) = 4.90, p = .025.
217. Vignette 2:f= 128 for codified rationales andf= 70 for noncodified rationales, X2(1,
N = 198) = 16.41, p = .000. Vignette 4: f = 124 for codified rationales versus f = 73 for
noncodified rationales, X2(1, N = 197) = 12.69, p = .001.
218. f= 102 each.
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standards) were significantly more frequently chosen than rationales "A"
(based on the law) and "D" (unable to identify a specific reason and/or
intuition).219 Thus, attorneys based their decisions on the legal code of
ethics applicable in Florida at the time (a codified reason) and on their
personal values and standards (a noncodified reason) significantly more
frequently than they based their decisions on the law and/or intuition or
were unable to identify a specific reason. 220
4. Hypothesis 3: Were More Ethical or Restrictive
Action Choices Typically Associated with Codified
Rationales Rather than Noncodified Rationales?
Again, results varied from vignette to vignette. However, in three
of the five vignettes, in sharp contrast to what was expected, attorneys'
choices based on noncodified rationales were more ethical or restrictive
than were choices based on codified rationales. This result was the
opposite of the hypothesis. In one vignette, there were no significant
differences in ethical or restrictiveness ratings of choices based on
codified versus noncodified reasons. Only in the last vignette did the
predicted hypothesis operate, i.e., the choices based on codified
rationales were more restrictive or more ethical than the choices based
on noncodified rationales.
Specifically, for Vignette 1 (which involved taking a case outside
one's area of expertise), there was no significant difference in the
restrictiveness ratings between the should and would groups of
subjects.22 However, the action choices of the group of subjects who
relied on noncodified rationales were significantly more restrictive than
those of the group of subjects who relied on codified rationales.m The
interaction between the two independent variables was not significant for
this vignette.2'
The results for Vignette 2 (involving a conflict of interest due to
prior representation) were the same as the results for Vignette 1. There
were no significant differences in the restrictiveness ratings of action
choices between the should and would groups,224 but significantly
219. Bf= 455; Cf= 415; Af= 41; D/= 81; A,BX 2 (1, N = 496) = 343.9, p = .000;
A,C,) 2(1, N = 456) = 305.11, p = .000; B,DX 2(1, N = 536) = 259.57, p = .000; C,DX 2(l, N =
496) = 223.57; p = .000. "A" and "B" were codified rationales; "C" and "D" were noncodified
rationales.
220. In addition, rationale "D" was significantly more frequently chosen than "A,"
indicating that reliance on law was least frequently used (Q2(1, N = 122) = 12.47; p = .001).
221. F(1, 191) = .10, p = .75.
222. F(1, 191) = 30.29, p = .000.
223. F(1, 191) = 1.747, p = .188.
224. F(1, 192) = .017, p = .896.
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more restrictive ratings were found in those relying on noncodified
reasons as compared to those relying on codified rationales for their
choices.' Also, the interaction between the two independent variables
for this vignette was not significant. 6
The results for Vignette 3 (involving misuse of confidential
information) were different than for the first two vignettes. The main
effect of the should vs. would condition was significant,227 in that
"would" choices were significantly more restrictive than "should"
choices. The main effect of the codified vs. noncodified rationale
condition was not significant,' and the interaction was not significant. 9
The results for Vignette 4 (involving possible perjury by a client
at trial) paralleled those for Vignettes 1 and 2. There was no significant
main effect for the should vs. would condition.2" However, the main
effect of the codified vs. noncodified rationale condition was significant;
the attorneys relying on noncodified rationales again chose significantly
more restrictive action choices than those relying on codified rationales. "1 The interaction between the two independent variables was
not significant. 2
For Vignette 5 (involving misconduct by a fellow lawyer), like
Vignette 3, the main effect for the should vs. would condition was
significant; "would" choices were significantly more restrictive than
"should" choices. 3 The main effect for the codified vs. noncodified
rationale choices was also significant, but opposite of the results for
Vignettes 1, 2, and 4, in that the action choices of attorneys relying on
codified rationales were significantly more restrictive than those of
attorneys relying on noncodified rationales." The interaction between
the two independent variables was not significant. 5
Table 1 sets forth the results by group (should vs. would), by
rationale (codified vs. noncodified), and as totals for each of the five
vignettes.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

F(1,
F(1,
F(1,
F(1,
F(1,
F(1,
F(1,
F(1,
7(1,
F(1,
F(1,

192)
192)
198)
198)
198)
193)
193)
193)
192)
192)
192)

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

5.485, p = .02.
.782, p = .378.
4.388, p = .037.
.130, p = .719.
.421, p = .517.
.146, p = .703.
5.877, p = .016.
1.595, p = .208.
4.407, p = .037.
8.98, p = .003.
2.675, p = .104.
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TABLE 1
RESTRICTIVENESS OF ETHICAL CHOICE RATINGS
VIG. 1 VIG. 2 VIG. 3 VIG. 4 VIG. 5
GROUP:
"SHOULD"
MEAN
SD

2.21
.95

0.77
.42

0.99
.46

1.52
.63

2.28
1.17

"WOULD"
MEAN
SD

2.25
.92

0.78
.42

1.13*
.48

1.57
.62

2.56*
.95

RATIONALE:
CODIFIED
MEAN
SD

1.72
.90

0.72
.45

1.07
.51

1.46
.63

2.67*
.74

NONCODIFIED:
MEAN
SD

2.46*
.85

0.87*
.34

1.05
.43

1.68*
.60

2.24
1.24

TOTALS:
MEAN
SD

2.23
.93

0.78
.42

1.06
.47

1.54
.63

2.42
1.08

* Indicates the mean restrictiveness rating is significantly more
restrictive or more ethical than the mean rating for the other condition.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
A. Efficacy of the Method Used; Response Rate
The 69.2% response rate, with 57.8% usable responses, suggests
that the questionnaires returned were a representative sample of the
attorneys selected as subjects. This response rate may have been better
than Landwehr's 21% response rate 6 for a number of reasons. First,
the dollar bill included as a good will gesture probably maximized the
response rate, consistent with an unpublished 1990 study by Williams.237 Williams found that including a dollar bill with a mailed
236. See Landwehr, supra note 6, at 43.
237. Williams, supra note 211.
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questionnaire raised the response rate from 23% to 47%.238 Second, the
questionnaire in this study involved less time and effort than Landwehr's
inquiry."3 9 Third, the attorneys in this study may have been more likely
to respond to a study being conducted by a fellow attorney under the
auspices of a local university. For purposes of future research, it is
important to note that attorneys were responsive to the methods used in
this study.
Only a few attorneys (9) mailed back the dollar only; one attorney
noted that he suspected that the dollar was the subject of the study
rather than the questionnaire. Thirty-nine percent of the responding
attorneys also returned the dollar. In contrast to the popular caricature
of attorneys as incorrigibly money-grubbing, many of the attorneys who
participated in this study voluntarily returned the financial compensation.
A more cynical view is that the money involved in this study simply
was not enough to interest attorneys.
B. Should/Would Differences
The results with respect to the should/would variable did not
support the hypothesis that what attorneys would do would be less
ethical than what they should do. On the two vignettes (Vignettes 3 and
5) where there were significant differences between the restrictiveness
of ethical choice ratings, the would choices were actually more ethical 2' than the should choices. In addition, the would choices were
more ethical than the should choices on all of the other three vignettes
(Vignettes 1, 2, and 4), although the differences were not statistically
significant. These findings support a tendency for would choices to be
more ethical than should choices, which is the opposite of the predicted
result1 and the opposite of findings concerning mental health professionals.

24

1. Artifact of the Study's Design
There are several possible reasons for the results discussed
above.242 First, unlike all of the previous studies conducted in the

238. Id.
239. See Landwehr, supra note 6, at 42-43. Although Landwehr only used two hypothetical
dilemmas, his questionnaire required written essay-style responses. Id.
240. "More ethical" means that the would choices had higher mean restrictiveness ratings
(Vig. 3, M = 1.13; Vig. 5, M = 2.56) than the should choices (Vig. 3, M = 0.99; Vig. 5, M =
2.28). The would choices were more conservative, more restrictive ethically, and more consistent
with the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar than were the should choices.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 182-90, 199-200.
242. However, it is unlikely that one of the reasons is a difference in response rates

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

39

Florida
Law Review,
Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

mental health field, the should/would variable was studied as a betweensubjects variable instead of as a within-subjects variable. It is possible
that the should/would differences found in previous studies resulted
simply from the design of the studies rather than from a true difference.
Subjects in the previous studies may have reported what they should do
as more restrictive or more ethical than what they would do based on
an expectancy that their should and would choices should differ, because
the questionnaires asked for both choices. This could be tested by
repeating the previous studies in the mental health field using a
between-subjects design, that is, half the subjects receiving a "should"
questionnaire and half receiving a "would" questionnaire.
Another possibility is that the attorneys simply ignored the words
"would" and "should" in the questionnaires and chose action choices
and rationales without really considering the question. It is likely that
the attorneys completed the questionnaires quickly in light of the fact
that an attorney's time is his or her stock in trade. However, this
possibility is unlikely because there were significant differences in the
ethical restrictiveness ratings of should versus would action choices for
Vignettes 3 and 5, a trend which was also reflected in the results for
Vignettes 1, 2, and 4, although the differences were not statistically
significant in those vignettes.
.2. "Should" Interpreted by Attorneys as
the Minimum Standard of Care
Attorneys clearly indicated that they would do more than they felt
they should do, in situations involving misuse of confidential information (Vignette 3) and misconduct of a fellow lawyer (Vignette 5). In
all of the vignettes, more than one action choice provided was consistent
with the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (Florida Rules). In all except
Vignette 2, at least one choice was inconsistent with the Florida Rules,
while all of the other choices were partially or completely consistent
with the Florida Rules. Thus, the attorneys could choose from more than
one choice which complied with Florida's ethics code. They may have
interpreted "should" as asking for the minimum standard of care

between the instant study and the mental health professionals' studies in which should choices
were consistently more ethical than would choices. Although some of the studies had low
response rates, others had relatively high response rates. See Bernard et al., supra note 182, at
490 (response rate of 50%); Bernard & Jara, supra note 182, at 314 (response rate of 68%);
Smith et al., supra note 182, at 237 (response rate of 44%); Wilkins et al., supra note 182, at
541 (response rate of 34%). Instead, it is likely to have been the result of a difference in
methodology (i.e., the variable being studied as a between-subjects variable instead of a withinsubject variable) or an inherent difference between attorneys and mental health professionals.
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required by the ethics code, and to reflect this minimum, chose the least
restrictive of the several choices that complied with the code. Then, they
may have chosen the more restrictive choices as their "would" choices
to reflect that they would do more than the minimum required by the
ethics code. If this is the case, then for at least Vignettes 3 and 5, the
attorneys may have interpreted what they "should" do as the minimum
required, and indicated that, in these two cases, they "would" do more
than the minimum if faced with the dilemma. The trend, albeit
statistically insignificant, noted for the other three vignettes suggests that
this interpretation may be correct for those situations as well.
3. Possible Differences Between Lawyers
and Mental Health Professionals
These findings are inconsistent with similar research involving
mental health professionals. In several studies, mental health professionals indicated that in ethical dilemma situations they should do more than
they would do.243 The inconsistency may be due to the subjects
involved or differences in the goals of the legal code of ethics as
compared to the American Psychological Association's (APA) ethical
principles.
First, as described above, attorneys may have responded to this
study's questionnaires differently than mental health professionals in the
sense that they interpreted "should" as asking for the minimum standard
of care. Alternatively, the results suggest that attorneys may be more
likely to report only that they would behave more ethically or more
conservatively than they believe they should, while mental health
professionals may be more willing to report that they would behave less
ethically than they believe they should. This would simply reflect a
difference in willingness to admit doing less than one should, because
lawyers may be more sensitive to and concerned about liability arising
when one does less than one believes one should.2' This could be due

243. See supra text accompanying notes 182-90.
244. For example, if "should" was interpreted as referring to what the Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar require, while "would" was interpreted as what the attorney reports he or she would
do, then perhaps the attorneys wished to give the impression that they would do more than
simply the minimum that is required by the Rules. Even though failure to abide by the legal
code of ethics does not constitute malpractice per se in most jurisdictions, many attorneys still
may be wary of admitting any conduct which is not exactly compliant with or more conservative
than what the Rules require. See Charlotte Moses Fischman & Jeffrey Davis, The Lawyer as
Civil Defendant: Recent Developments in the Law of Legal Malpractice, 403 PRAC. L.
INsTJLrIrG. 609, 624-26 (1990) (stating "[the virtually unanimous position of state courts is that
a violation of the ethical standards does not in and of itself give the client a cause of action in
tort or establish per se liability" and discussing recent decisions to this effect). This cautious
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to lawyers' sensitivity to potential malpractice liability or disciplinary
action resulting from a failure to comply with the legal code of
ethics.245 Mental health professionals may not be as focused on
liability, because of the nature of their work and training.
Second, it is possible that "should" was interpreted as referring to
the ethics code, and the APA's ethical principles are interpreted by
mental health professionals as providing the appropriate or ideal action
to take in certain situations, while the legal code of ethics is interpreted
by attorneys as providing the minimum standard of care in professional
ethical dilemmas. This interpretation suggests that ethics codes function
differently in different professions.
4. Implications for Actual Ethical Behavior
The should/would findings may be consistent with previous studies
finding that what attorneys actually do is often different from what they
report they do. 2" The finding that what they report they would do is
just as or more ethical than what they report they should do is consistent
withlawyers' (and other people's) tendency to overestimate their actual
behavior.247 Further, the findings may not provide insight into what
attorneys actually would do, because of Tsujimoto and Emmons' finding
that, generally, actual moral behavior often differs from stated moral
intentions "4 and research described by Galie indicating that attorneys'
actual249behavior did not match their descriptions of their lawyering
style.

C. Reliance on Codified Versus Noncodified Rationales
The results did not support the hypothesis that attorneys would rely
more frequently on codified reasons, such as rules, regulations, and law,
when making ethical decisions' and also did not support the proposition that lawyers have a predominantly "conventional" or Kohlbergian
conduct may reflect Fischman and Davis' observation that "[a] significant number of courts have
held that while violation of the ethics rules does not represent negligence per se, it does
constitute some evidence of the attorney's negligence." Id. at 627-28. As a result of this holding,
an attorney's violation of the ethics code may lead to later admissibility of expert testimony
about the attorney's violation at a malpractice trial. Id.
245. See generally id. at 620-31 (describing various situations of attorney's professional
liability involving violations of ethics rules).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 169-77.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
248. Tsujimoto & Emmons, supra note 166, at 243.
249. See Galie, supra note 173, at 78 (finding that civil commitment lawyers who claimed
to prefer an adversary style of lawyering often actually acted in the best interest of their clients).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56.
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Stage 4 orientation." While codified rationales were not chosen more
frequently overall than noncodified rationales, 252 this appears to be a
result of a strong interaction between specific vignettes and rationales.
Thus, for Vignettes 2 and 4, codified rationales were chosen more
frequently than noncodified rationales (consistent with expectations).
Noncodified rationales were chosen more frequently for Vignettes 1 and
5. For Vignette 3, codified and noncodified rationales were chosen with
equal frequency. This may have been due to the fact that some
vignettes' situations are covered by the Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar and others are not, so that in some of the vignettes, the code of
ethics provided specific guidance for action while in others there was no
code provision on point. 3
1. Possible Failure in Study's Design
One possible reason for these results is that the questionnaires used
may not have adequately matched codified rationales to Kohlberg's
Stage 4 or conventional moral reasoning. In other words, the study's
questionnaires' simply may not have accurately measured or reflected
lawyers' stage of moral development. Attorneys may have used a
conventional, Stage 4 analysis to arrive at their choices and yet not have
believed that they were relying on law, rules, and regulations to make
their decisions.' This uncertainty could possibly be resolved by
replicating Landwehr's study or administering Rest's DIT 5 to a
random sample of practicing attorneys while ensuring that the response
rate was similar to the 69.2% achieved in the instant study. Thus, further
research is necessary to determine whether lawyers differ from the
general population in their moral development.

251. See supra text accompanying notes 146-58.
252. See supra text accompanying note 201.
253. See generally infra app. B (discussing which provisions of the ethics code apply to

each vignette).
254. Other reasons for the inconsistency with Landwehr's findings and conclusions may be
that there was a flaw in Landwehr's study, such as the low response rate making an
unrepresentative sample. See Landwehr, supra note 6, at 43-44.
255. This was the instrument used by Willging and Dunn in their study. Willging & Dunn,
supra note 7, at 308.
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2. Lawyers Exhibit Case-by-Case Decisionmaking
Rather than a Stage 4 Rule-Based Orientation
In contrast to previous research by Tapp and Levine, Landwehr,
and Janoff,256 the codified/noncodified results of the instant study may
indicate that attorneys did not uniformly display a law and order, rulebased, conventional, Kohlbergian Stage 4 orientation. The results may
be consistent with other research indicating that moral development of
attorneys does not appreciably differ from that of the general population.' Instead, rationales for attorneys' ethical decisions may depend
primarily upon the situation. The results of the instant study support that
research in this area has yielded inconsistent and conflicting results and
that clarifying research needs to be done.
The results of this study can be interpreted as suggesting that the
participating attorneys generally responded to ethical dilemmas involving
their professional practice on a case-by-case basis. They may have
determined what they would/should do and the reasons for those
decisions differently depending on the situation presented. Instead of
being predominantly rule-oriented, Stage 4 decisionmakers, lawyers may
be as flexible in their approach to ethical dilemmas as are nonlawyers.
Alternatively, because the dilemmas presented were not always covered
by a particular provision of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar,
perhaps even the most rule-oriented attorney was forced to rely on
noncodified reasons for his or her decisions."8 Finally, a less favorable
explanation is that attorneys do different things in different situations,
based on whether or not there will be externally enforced consequences
for their actions."
3. Lawyers May Display Different Moral Reasoning in
Personal vs. Professional Situations
Alternatively, the inconsistency with previous studies may represent
a difference in lawyers' decisionmaking in a "real-life," personal
dilemma, which Landwehr studied,2" versus a dilemma involving the

256. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74, 131-42, 146-52.
257. See, e.g., Saunders & Levine, supra note 107, at 181-82; Willging & Dunn, supra note

7, at 157-58.
258. See infra text accompanying notes 280-81.
259. In a Kohlbergian sense, this would be consistent with a Stage 1 morality. See supra
text accompanying notes 50-51 (stating the Stage 1 morality is based on avoidance of externally
enforced consequences). Although there may be some who would argue that lawyers are this
"undeveloped" morally, most empirical studies suggest that attorneys' Kohlbergian stage of
moral development is at least higher than Stage 1. See supra text accompanying notes 67-164.
260. See Landwehr, supra note 6, at 43 n.6.
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attorney in a professional role and subject to a legal code of ethics,
which was the focus of this study. It is possible that attorneys rely on
rules and regulations more heavily in personal dilemmas, but they utilize
rules and regulations and personal values and standards to different
degrees, depending on the situation, in professional ethical dilemmas.
This interpretation is consistent with findings of Saunders and Levine
that law students did not appear to reason consistently at one level, but
rather they might employ postconventional reasoning in one situation
and conventional reasoning in another.261
4. Lawyers May Employ Different Moral Reasoning
in Others' Dilemmas than in Their Own Dilemmas
Another possible interpretation is that attorneys operate almost
exclusively at Stage 4 when considering others' ethical dilemmas, but
operate in a less rigid manner when considering ethical dilemmas
involving themselves. Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma, one of the vignettes
used by Landwehr, asks the reader to determine what Heinz (a fictional
person) should do and why.262 The ethical vignettes used in the instant
study asked the reader what the reader would or should do and why.
This distinction may provide another explanation for the difference in
results between Landwehr's study and the instant study. If lawyers are
typically asked by clients or others what the law is in a situation and
what the right thing to do is under the law, then it makes sense that
lawyers would tend to assess others' dilemmas according to this
unspoken question, which is a Stage 4-type of inquiry. At the same
time, lawyers may assess their own ethical dilemmas according to a
more flexible inquiry (demonstrating Stages 3-6 reasoning), which could
explain the variety of reasons for decisions reported by the attorneys in
the instant study.
Thus, lawyers may be internally inconsistent. They may apply
Stage 4 reasoning to others' problems and apply Stage 3, 4, 5, or 6
reasoning to their own dilemmas. If such an inconsistency exists in
lawyers' bases for decisions, it would tend to highlight and support the
existence of a personal dilemma for lawyers. One of the theorized
reasons for attorney dissatisfaction is the personal struggle resulting
from the need to think logically, "like a lawyer," at work and to be a
human being at home. 3 Similarly, the result of this study may explain
261. Saunders & Levine, supra note 107, at 181.
262. Landwehr, supra note 6, at 43 n.6.
263. Adrienne Drell, Chilling Out, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 70 (arguing that attorneys
cannot turn it off at home and are overly aggressive and argumentative); see also Phil
Nuernberger, From Gunfighter to Samurai: Bringing Life Quality to the Practice of Law, 66
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why the public can be frustrated when interacting with attorneys and
why it perceives that attorneys do not seem to talk or think like regular
human beings do.
5. Lawyers May Employ Stage 4 Reasoning in Litigation
Settings and Not in Office Settings
A vignette-by-vignette analysis yields results suggesting an even
further distinction in lawyers' approaches to ethical decisionmaking. In
Vignettes 1 and 5, which deal with taking a case outside one's area of
expertise and a fellow lawyer's misconduct, respectively, attorneys relied
significantly more frequently on noncodified rationales. Thus, in these
situations, attorneys' decisions were more frequently based on personal
values and standards than on what the law or ethics code requires. In
Vignettes 2 and 4, which deal with conflict of interest with prior
representation of a client and possible perjury by the client in a civil
trial, respectively, attorneys relied significantly more frequently on
codified rationales. This result suggests that in these situations, decisions
were more frequently based on what the law or ethics code requires.
Vignettes 2 and 4 both dealt with litigation. Perhaps attorneys considered these vignettes to be situations in which the attorney's conduct
would be more visible and, therefore, more likely to be subject to
censure by other attorneys or by a member of the judiciary. Vignettes
1 and 5 may have been seen as situations more within the realm of
attorneys' good judgment in conducting their practice, rather than
situations involving their role as officers of the court. Codified and
noncodified rationales were equally frequently chosen in Vignette 3, a
situation involving litigation and possible misuse of confidential
information, and, therefore, neither supports nor refutes the above
explanation for the results in the other vignettes.2
One possible conclusion of this analysis is that attorneys rely more
frequently on rule-based, codified rationales such as the legal code of
ethics in situations involving litigation, and rely more frequently on
noncodified rationales such as personal values and standards in
situations involving office practices that do not involve the courts. This
N.Y. ST. B.J. 6 (1994). This theorized conflict is also consistent with Jack and Jack's assertion
that some women lawyers experience disequilibrium and struggle because they are unable to
successfully resolve the conflict between having a caring, emotional personality and being a
lawyer. Janoff, supra note 26, at 230 (citing RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISIONS
AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUE OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 20,
130-55 (1988)). These women are believed to continually experience an unresolved and
unsettling conflict between their private and professional personas. Id. at 230-31.
264. However, Vignette 3 is somewhat different from the others, in that there is no ethics
rule directly addressing the fact situation presented in the vignette. See infra app. B.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss2/1

46

Daicoff: (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Stu
ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING BY ATTORNEYS

is somewhat consistent with Smith and his colleagues' findings that
codified rationales were "legal" dilemmas while solutions to "nonlegal"
dilemmas were equally frequently based on codified and noncodified
reasons.265 Perhaps this result also fleshes out Landwehr's findings;"
perhaps lawyers do tend to operate at a rule-based, Stage 4 orientation,
but only when litigation is involved. Because the public often comes
into contact with lawyers only via litigation, a layperson's perception of
lawyers may be degraded by the conflict between the person's own
feelings about the litigation and the lawyers' rule-oriented approach in
that setting.267
6. Influx of Women Into the Profession
May Explain Results
Finally, the results of the instant study may be consistent with
Landwehr's 1982 study and with Tapp and Levine's 1974 study if one
considers the effect of the influx of women into the legal profession
after 1980.2' Tapp and Levine studied graduating law students in
1971, and Landwehr studied practicing lawyers before 1982; thus their
samples were likely to be predominantly (if not entirely) male.269 Both
studies found predominantly conventional or Stage 4 moral reasoning in
the subjects. 20
In contrast, the Stanford Study and Janoff found gender differences
in the moral reasoning styles of law students; unlike make law students,
female law students often did not display a rule-and-regulation,
conventional, rights-, logic-, or justice-oriented style of moral reasoning." Thus, the inclusion of women in the sample, whose moral
reasoning may differ from men's, could explain why later studies have
found no consistent stage of moral reasoning in lawyers and law
students. 2 For example, Saunders and Levine found this lack of

265. See supra note 194.

266. Landwehr, supra note 6, at 50.
267. The author has found this phenomenon to be supported by much anecdotal evidence
gathered from laypersons. Laypersons tend to become frustrated with lawyers after they relate
their tales of lawsuit woe to a lawyer, and then the lawyer responds with the statement, "But
that's the law."
268. See generally A.B.A. COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, BASIC FACrs FROM

WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS (1995) (reporting on the increase in numbers

of women in law school and the legal profession).
269. Landwehr, supra note 6, at 43 (may have been in 1978); Tapp & Levine, supra note
67, at 23 n.86.
270. Id.
271. Janoff, supra note 26, at 222; Taber et al., supra note 26, at 1249-51.
272. Even though some women appear to be molded by law school into the masculine
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consistency in 1994 in the law students they studied,273 and the instant
study (performed in 1991) also found no consistent, Stage 4 or
conventional moral reasoning among practicing lawyers.
D. Codified Rationales Were Not Associated with More
Ethical Choices (Exceptfor Colleague's Misconduct)
It was predicted that attorneys' choices based on codified rationales
would be more restrictive ethically than their choices based on
noncodified rationales, consistent with Haas, et al.'s and Smith, et al.'s
findings.274 However, this was true only in Vignette 5, dealing with
reporting a fellow lawyer's misconduct. For Vignettes 1, 2, and 4, the
results were opposite the predicted hypothesis; that is, attorneys' choices
based on noncodified rationales were more ethical than choices based
on codified rationales.
1. Lawyers' Ethics Codes Function as Minimums,
Unlike Other Professionals' Codes
In Vignettes 1, 2, and 4, attorneys' more restrictive and ethical
choices appeared to come from their personal values and standards. In
these situations, perhaps simply relying on laws and the Rules Regarding The Florida Bar Would have resulted in a minimum standard of care.
Thus, higher or more conservative choices resulted from reliance on
personal values dictating a standard above nd beyond what the Rules
required. Vignette 3 may be distinguishable, since the Rules did not
provide a clear answer as to the appropriate action to be taken in that
situation.275 Vignette 5 also may represent a unique situation, as
discussed below.
Again, these results suggest that, unlike mental health professionals,276 lawyers view ethics codes based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct'm as a minimum standard for behavior rather than as
reasoning style, some may retain their different orientation or revert back to that orientation once
in practice. See supra text accompanying notes 117-45.
273. Saunders & Levine, supra note 107, at 181.
274. See Haas et al., supra note 191, at 40; Smith et al., supra note 182, at 237-38.
275. See infra app. B (a complete analysis of the rules applicable to each vignette,
including Vignette 3).
276. The results of this study of lawyers were quite different from the results of several
prior similar studies of psychologists and other mental health professionals. See supra text
accompanying notes 182-96.
277. This assertion is limited to ethics codes such as Florida's, which follow the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Codes which follow the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility may function somewhat differently, based on the different structure of the Model
Code and the Model Rules.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss2/1

48

Daicoff: (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Stu
ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING BY A7TORNEYS

an ideal towards which lawyers should strive. In articulating ideal
behavior, it appears that attorneys look to their own personal values and
standards instead. This empirical result indirectly suggests that such
codes of ethics are insufficient and inadequate in assisting lawyers to
identify ideal or optimal ethical behavior."' It also undercuts the
public perception of attorneys as unethical and seems inconsistent with
recent concern about lawyers' "growing" lack of ethics." 9
In interpreting the empirical findings of this study, it may be
important to note that the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar essentially
follow the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rather than the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. The Model Code provides
minimums for action, in its "Disciplinary Rules," as well as aspirational
goals for behavior, in its "Ethical Considerations.""28 In contrast, the
Model Rules provide only minimums for action, and then provide
additional explanation in the Comments to the Rules.2"' If Florida was
using an ethics code based on the Model Code, then perhaps the
responding attorneys could have viewed the rationale called "Based on
what the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar provide or allow" as
referring only to the Disciplinary Rules and not to the more aspirational
278. For example, Brent Dickson and Julia Jackson discuss individual case decisions and
civility standards separate from ethics codes as two ways of increasing civil behavior by
attorneys. Brent E.Dickson & Julia B. Jackson, Renewing Lawyer Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REv.
531, 534 (1994). They explain that aspirational standards are needed above and beyond ethics
codes. See id. at 541. As part of this discussion, they quote Justice Harold G. Clarke, who
expresses the inadequacy of ethics codes, in discussing the work of the Georgia Supreme Court's
Commission on Professionalism thus:
It seems to me that the spirit of the calling to the law practice needs to get more
attention. We ought not to ignore the letter of the law and the letter of ethics, but
we need also give attention to the spirit that's behind it, and maybe that is part of
what professionalism is. Maybe once you've got slavish adherence to all the
rules-the standards and the Code of Professional Responsibility-then the next
thing is to not only adhere to them technically but to try to live up to the reasons
behind them in a more philosophical way.
Id. at 534 (quoting
PROFESSIONALISM

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA,

CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON

27 (1990)).

279. Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., A Survey of Attitudes Nationwide Toward
Lawyers and the Legal System 5, 18, 36 (Jan. 1993); see also Raquel A. Rodriguez,
Chairperson'sColumn, Uncivil Litigation, BARRISTER MAG., Summer 1996, at 2 (citing John
Marks, The American Uncivil Wars, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 22, 1996 at 69)
(discussing the lack of esteem the public holds for lawyers because of lack of professionalism).
Of course, attorneys' actual behavior may not reflect what they report they would or should do.
See Tsujimoto & Emmons, supra note 166, at 243.
280. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
281. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
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Ethical Considerations. However, Florida follows the Model Rules so
the attorneys' reliance on noncodified reasons for their more ethical
choices does not appear to be an artifact of the structure of the ethics
code in Florida.
2. Reliance on Rules and Regulations Only When
Reporting Another's Misconduct
In contrast, when dealing with reporting a fellow lawyer's
misconduct, undeniably an unpleasant task for any lawyer, the attorneys'
more restrictive choices were associated with codified rationales. This
is consistent with the findings of Smith and his colleagues with respect
to mental
health professionals faced with reporting a colleague's miscon22
duct. 8
It appears that, in this situation, if left to one's personal values and
standards, the choice might be less ethical and less conservative than if
one followed what the law or legal code of ethics requires. It may be
that it is easier for a lawyer to choose a more ethical and conservative
choice in situations involving one's own ethics than in situations
involving policing a colleague's actions. When carrying out an
unpleasant task, like reporting a colleague's misconduct, it may be easier
to accept that the law or legal code of ethics requires some particular
action than to justify taking action based on one's own personal
standards. This would explain why attorneys tended to rely on laws and
codes in justifying their more ethical, conservative choices only in
Vignette 5.
Apparently, lawyers view reporting a colleague's misconduct as
different from other professional ethical dilemmas involving only one's
own potential misconduct. 283 It is likely that this dilemma evokes
different responses due to the unpleasantness of reporting a colleague,
lawyers' tendency to be protective of other lawyers,2 ' and the fact that
another person besides the lawyer is involved.

282. See Smith et al., supra note 182, at 237. However, Smith and his colleagues also
presented their subjects with a variety of ethical dilemmas and consistently found that more
restrictive choices were associated with codified rationales for a variety of situations, id. at 23738, unlike the lawyers in the instant study, who displayed this association only in Vignette 5.
283. Contrast this finding with the implication of the results of the study of Wilkins and
his colleagues which found that mental health professionals say they would do less than they
believe they should regarding a colleague's misconduct as well as in dilemmas involving their
own ethical conduct. Wilkins et al., supra note 182, at 540-42.
284. Don S. Anderson et al., Conservatismin Recruits to the Professions,9 AUSTL. & N.Z.
J. Soc. 42, 44 (1973) (finding that lawyers, engineers, and doctors become more protective of
their professions during their professional training).
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E. No RelationshipBetween Should/Would Choices
and Codified/Noncodified Rationales
The lack of any significant relationship between should/would
choices and codified/noncodified rationales in the statistical analyses
(e.g., ANOVAs) for each vignette suggests that there was no relationship between choosing should or would action choices and different
rationales. Alternatively, this finding could have been an artifact of the
study's design, in that it simply reflects the result of testing the
should/would variable as a between-subjects variable.
V. CONCLUSION

Ethical decisionmaking by attorneys as studied herein is a complex
phenomenon and varies from situation to situation. It appears that
attorneys approach ethical decisionmaking on a case-by-case basis. It
seems that attorneys do not take a consistent or rigid approach to ethical
decisionmaking; rather, they consider the facts of each situation, respond
differently to different situations, and base their decisions on different
rationales in different settings. This is consistent with the idea that
lawyers are trained in law school to study law on a case-by-case basis.
Although it appears that attorneys do approach ethical decisionmaking
differently than do mental health professionals, they may not necessarily
be rigid, conventional, or homogeneous in their ethical decisionmaking.
Indeed, they may be no different from the general population. Finally,
lawyers' ethics codes seem to function as minimum standards for ethical
behavior, while mental health professionals' ethics codes may represent
aspirational ideals for behavior. 5 This distinction may indirectly
support the criticism that existing legal ethics codes do not provide
adequate guidance in establishing optimal behavior.
The results of this study indicate that accurate prediction of ethical
decisionmaking behavior by attorneys is unlikely to be possible, due to
the case-by-case approach of attorneys to their tasks. The public can be
assured, however, that lawyers do seem to approach ethical
decisionmaking carefully and with due consideration of the facts of each
situation. Also, attorneys often report that they would do as much as or
more than they think they should, while psychologists and other mental
health professionals consistently have reported that they would do less
than they think they should." 6 Attorneys thus compare favorably to
mental health professionals empirically, despite the public's negative

285. See supra text accompanying notes 191-96.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 182-90.
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perception of the integrity of lawyers and the legal system. 8 7 Of
course, further research is necessary to determine the extent to which
attorneys' moral intentions translate into moral actions, in the context of
professional ethical dilemmas. It is hoped that continued research in this
area can enhance the public perception of attorneys and the integrity of
their decisions in the practice of law.

287. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
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APPENDIX A
Cover Letter and "Should" Questionnaire
August 26, 1991
Dear Attorney:
I am writing to request your participation in a research study of
attorneys' ethical decisionmaking. This research is part of my master's
thesis for the graduate clinical psychology program of the University of
Central Florida, under the supervision of Dr. John M. McGuire,
Professor of Psychology, University of Central Florida (407/823-2216).
If you are interested in receiving a summary of the results of this study,
when completed, please write or call Dr. McGuire at the above address
and he will forward a copy to you. A copy of the full thesis will be
available at the UCF library under my name.
Your participation will be completely anonymous and should only
take a few moments-just circle your answers to the multiple choice
questions on the attached questionnaire and mail it back to me with the
prepaid return envelope which has been enclosed for your convenience.
Although late questionnaires will be gladly accepted, please try to return
the enclosed questionnaire by September 16, 1991.
As a lawyer, I realize how difficult it is to want to spend your
nonbillable time on a project like this. Your participation in this study
will not only allow me to graduate (!), but should add to research
benefitting the legal profession. Please accept the enclosed dollar as a
good will gesture for your taking the time to consider and hopefully
respond to this project. While your participation in this research is
entirely voluntary and you may choose not to participate or to refrain
from answering any particular question, I hope that you will participate
fully in this effort.
For any questions or comments, please contact me at the address
below. Thank you for your participation-it is greatly appreciated.
Very truly yours,
Susan Daicoff, J.D., LL.M.
10151 University Boulevard Number 150
Orlando, Florida 32817-1904
(Please turn page over)
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ETHICAL DILEMMA QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire contains five vignettes presenting dilemmas involving
legal ethical questions.
Read each one carefully and, based on the information given, choose
ONE answer which best reflects what you think you SHOULD do in the
situation. Then, from the four rationales at the bottom of each page,
select ONE rationale which best fits your reason for your decision as to
what you SHOULD do.
There is no reason to perform any legal or ethical research to answer
this questionnaire, although you may do so if you wish. Thanks again
for your kind participation.
Please answer all of the questions; do not leave any blank.

I. A client comes to see you for the first time. He has never hired a
lawyer before. In the first interview, it is clear that the client's legal
problem is one which you consider to be outside your area of expertise.
You have never handled a similar type of problem before. However, the
legal issue is interesting and the client is clearly willing and able to pay
all legal fees necessary to resolve the matter.
You SHOULD (circle your choice):
1. Accept him as a client only after discussing with him your level of
experience with issues such as his, and you plan to educate yourself in
that area of law.
2. Accept him as a client but engage an expert lawyer as your cocounsel on the case (one who's expert in the client's problem area). You
will not be "fee-splitting," you will perform all the necessary legal work
on the case, enlisting the other lawyer's help only with the special legal
issues.
3. Accept him as a client and do not discuss your inexperience with
him.
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4. Not accept him as a client, but refer him to another lawyer who has
more experience in the client's problem area.
Rationale for your decision (circle your choice):
A. Based on what the law provides or allows.
B. Based on what the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (the legal code
of ethics) provide or allow.
C. Based on personal values and/or standards.
D. Unable to identify a specific reason and/or intuition (i.e., it feels
right).
II. A woman who had been a longstanding client of yours came in with
her second husband to discuss estate planning. Her husband discussed
his finances with you only in a general way. You drafted wills for both
of them, but only the wife executed her will, and you had no further
contact with the husband. Thereafter, the woman files for divorce from
her second husband and is represented by other counsel. In the course
of the divorce proceedings, it is found that her second husband has been
sexually molesting her daughter from her first marriage. Criminal
proceedings against the husband are possible. She approaches you and
asks you to represent her daughter in a civil suit against h6r estranged
second husband.
You SHOULD (circle your choice):
1. Agree to represent the daughter in a civil suit against the second
husband.
2. Refuse to represent the daughter in a civil suit against the second
husband due to your prior representation of him in connection with his
estate planning.
Rationale for your decision (circle your choice):
A. Based on what the law provides or allows.
B. Based on what the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (the legal code
of ethics) provide or allow.
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C. Based on personal values and/or standards.
D. Unable to identify a specific reason and/or intuition (i.e., it feels
right).
III. You belong to a 17-member law firm, and you represent the plaintiff
in a civil case. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant's
attorney's secretary leaves his employ and is hired by your firm's office
manager to work for another attorney in your firm. Because of this, the
defendant's attorney is seeking your disqualification from representing
the plaintiff in the civil case. The secretary was directly and substantially involved in the case while she worked for defense counsel. You were
unaware that she was being hired by your firm.
You SHOULD (circle your choice):
1. Continue to represent the plaintiff, but build a "Chinese Wall" around
the defense counsel's former secretary, meaning that you ensure that she
is not involved in any way with the work done on the civil case.
2. Withdraw from representation of the plaintiff.
3. Continue to represent the plaintiff in the civil case. You do not solicit
any information from the defense counsel's former secretary about the
case, but you do not feel it is necessary to take special action to isolate
her from the work being done on the case.
Rationale for your decision (circle your choice):
A. Based on what the law provides or allows.
B. Based on what the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (the legal code
of ethics) provide or allow.
C. Based on personal values and/or standards.
D. Unable to identify a specific reason and/or intuition (i.e., it feels
right).
IV. You represent the plaintiff in a civil case. On the night before the
trial, your client asks you questions and makes comments which clearly
lead you to believe that the client has lied to you and will continue to
lie at trial. If what the client is hinting at is the truth, then the client has
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a much weaker case. The client also lets you know that he intends to
stick with his previous story at trial, which means he will perjure
himself. When asked, the client denies that his statements are untrue, but
you are unconvinced.
You SHOULD (circle your choice):
1. Withdraw from representation of the plaintiff immediately, even
though it is the day of the trial.
2. Continue on with the trial and allow the plaintiff to testify, because
he has denied to you that he is lying.
3. Ask for a continuance of the trial, giving a reason which does not
breach confidentiality, such as: the fact that you have received "new
evidence" and need more time to prepare your case. Then, let the client
know that you will withdraw from representation if he does not stop
lying.
Rationale for your decision (circle your choice):
A. Based on what the law provides or allows.
B. Based on what the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (the legal code
of ethics) provide or allow.
C. Based on personal values and/or standards.
D. Unable to identify a specific reason and/or intuition (i.e., it feels
right).
V. You are a partner in a medium sized law firm. You learn that one of
your former partners (while he was your partner) failed to file a suit
within the limitations period, failed to tell the client of this "oversight,"
then paid the client a sum of money and told the client that it was
received in settlement from the putative defendant's insurer.
You SHOULD (circle your choice):
1. Inform your former partner's client of his actions, but do not report
him to the grievance committee of The Florida Bar.
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2. Report your partner to the grievance committee of The Florida Bar
but do not report his actions to his client.
3. Report the actions of your former partner to both his client and to the
grievance committee of The Florida Bar, without contacting your former
partner.
4. Do nothing.
5. Talk to your former partner and urge him to "come clean" with the
client (but you don't report him to his client or to the Bar).
6. Talk to your former partner before you contact his client or the
grievance committee of The Florida Bar, and give him the chance to tell
his client and The Florida Bar of his actions before you do. If he does
not do so, you inform the client and the grievance committee of The
Florida Bar of his actions.
Rationale for your decision (circle your choice):
A. Based on what the law provides or allows.
B. Based on what the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar (the legal code
of ethics) provide or allow.
C. Based on personal values and/or standards.
D. Unable to identify a specific reason and/or intuition (i.e., it feels
right).
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APPENDIX B
RATIONALES FOR ETHICAL RESTRICTIVENESS
RATINGS OF CHOICES
The five dilemmas are: (a) referral (client's problem is outside the
attorney's area of expertise), (b) conflict of interest (representation of
former and present clients may create a conflict of interest), (c)
disqualification and misuse of confidential information (attorney must
decide whether to stop representing a client due to a conflict of interest),
(d) dishonest client (on the day before trial, the attorney learns the client
has been lying and may perjure himself), and (e) reporting client neglect
(attorney must decide whether to report a former law partner's ethical
misconduct to the appropriate authorities). The following is an explanation of the rationales behind the assignment of an ethical restrictiveness
rating to each action choice in each of the five dilemmas.
Dilemma I:
1. Rating: 1. This is permissible under the legal code of ethics. A
lawyer can take cases in areas in which she is not experienced if she
ensures that she educates herself sufficiently so that the client is getting
adequate representation."' The lawyer also has informed the client so
that the
client can make an informed decision about hiring the law89
2

yer.

288. See RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 4-1.1 & cmt., in FLA. B.J., Sept.
1996, at 564 [hereinafter FLORIDA RULES] (requiring that a lawyer provide competent
representation to clients); FLORIDA RULES ch. 4 pmbl. ("In all professional functions a lawyer
should be competent, prompt, and diligent."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule
1.1 & cmt. 4 (1994) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (stating that a lawyer may accept representation
when through preparation that lawyer can reach the "requisite level of competence"); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-3 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] (discussing
failure to act competently); MODEL CODE DR 6-101(A) (stating a lawyer should not handle a
matter that he or she is not competent to handle). The Florida Bar has adopted, with some
alterations, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as its ethics code. See FLORIDA RULES
ch.4. Any distinctions between the two codes will be noted parenthetically.
289. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-1.4(b) (requiring that the client receive
sufficient information to make an informed decision in a matter); MODEL RULES, supra note
288, Rule 1.4(b) (same); MODEL CODE, supra note 288, EC 2-22 (stating that a lawyer should
not bring in another lawyer unless the client consents); MODEL CODE EC 7-8 ("A lawyer should
exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been
informed of relevant considerations.").
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2. Rating: 2. This is less restrictive than 4, but more conservative
than 1. Because the lawyer has engaged expert help on the case, he is
less likely to miss some important point of law due to his inexperience.2" It is important that he is not "fee-splitting"-taking a referral
fee from the client for referring the client to the expert lawyer-which
is unethical."' 1 However, this choice is not as safe as 4, where he has
no responsibility for the case.2'
3. Rating: 0. This is the worst choice, because the lawyer does not
inform the client. As a result, the client is not making an informed
decision to hire the lawyer.293 Also, there is no statement in this choice
that the lawyer will educate herself adequately in the area of law.
Ethically, the lawyer has the responsibility to take steps to educate
herself in the area of law in which she is hired to work.294
290. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-1.1 cmt. ("Competent representation can
also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in
question."); MODEL RULES, supra note 288, 1.1 cmt. 2 (same); MODEL CODE, supra note 288,
EC 5-11 (stating that a lawyer's "personal interests should not deter him from suggesting
additional counsel be employed").
291. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-1.5(g) (permitting division of a fee
between lawyers only (1) when the division is in proportion to the work done by each lawyer
or (2) when the client consents to the division after being fully informed about the fee division
and each lawyer "assumes legal responsibility for the representation and agrees to be available
for consultation with the client"); MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule 1.5(e) (permitting
division of a fee between lawyers only when the client is fully advised of the fee division and
(1) the division is in proportion to the work done by each lawyer or (2) "by written agreement
with the client each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation"); MODEL CODE,
supra note 288, EC 2-22 (requiring that a fee division be in proportion to the services performed
and if each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation).
292. Division of a fee between lawyers usually results in both lawyers assuming
responsibility for the representation of the client. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 288. However, nothing in the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar nor
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires that the lawyer disclose to the client that the
lawyer is inexperienced. Also, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not require
that the lawyer tell the client that he is inexperienced, but only suggests that the lawyer "may
accept such employment if in good faith he expects to become qualified through study and
investigation." MODEL CODE, supra note 288, EC 6-3. The lawyer must either seek training in
the field or associate with another lawyer (in which case the lawyer must advise the client). See
supra text accompanying notes 288-91. The statements of the lawyer to the client must be
truthful and not misleading. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-7.1 ("A lawyer shall
not make ... a false, misleading, deceptive, or unfair communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services."); MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule 7.1 (same). Otherwise, in theory, the
lawyer may be subject to sanctions for misconduct if there is "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation." FLORIDA RULES Rule 4-8.4(c); MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(c); see also MODEL
CODE DR 6-101 (forbidding a lawyer from handling a matter in "which he knows or should
know that he is not competent to handle").
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4. Rating: 3. This is the most restrictive choice because it is the
most conservative. The lawyer has no risk of malpractice due to
handling a case in an area in which he is not skilled.295 Additionally,
the lawyer avoids the appearance of impropriety by not subjecting the
client to possibly poor or inadequate representation simply because the
client is eager to pay.
Dilemma 11:2'

Both Choice 1 and Choice 2 are permissible under the legal code
of ethics. Because the lawyer limitedly represented the husband and
received only general information about the husband's finances, the
lawyer's prior representation of him has ended and is not inconsistent
with this later lawsuit, the present representation does not create a
conflict of interest.297 In regards to confidential information, because
in the later lawsuit the lawyer would have access to the same type of
financial information that the lawyer received in the prior representation-when the lawyer tried to collect a judgment-the lawyer would
not be using confidential information against the husband in a later
case.29 His financial information is only relevant to the later case in
the sense of whether she can collect a judgment from him.
1. Rating: 0. This choice is permissible and ethical, although it is
somewhat more risky than Choice 2.2'
295. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-1.16(a) (stating a lawyer must decline
to represent a client if that representation violates the rule); MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule
1.16(a) (same); MODEL CODE, supra note 288, EC 2-26 (stating that although legal services
should be available to any person, a lawyer has the right to decline to represent a person); see
also FLORIDA RULES Rule 4-1.16(a) cmL ("A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter
unless it can be performed competently .... ); MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(a) cmt. I (same);
MODEL CODE EC 2-30 ("Employment should not be accepted by a lawyer when he is unable
to render competent service .... ").
296. This dilemma was based on A.B.A. & B.N.A., LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT: ETHICS OPINION 1986-1990, at 901:4327 (citing Comm. on Ethics of the Md. Bar
Ass'n, Formal Op. 89-61 (Sept. 21, 1989)).
297. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-1.9(a) (requiring that for a lawyer to be
disqualified from representing the present client, the present matter must be the same or
substantially related to the prior matter); MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule 1.9(a) (same); see
also MODEL CODE, supra note 288, EC 9-6 (stating that a lawyer should "strive to avoid not
only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety").
298. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-1.9 cmt. (stating that a lawyer may use
generally known information about a former client); MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule 1.9
cmt. 12 (same).
299. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-1.9 cmt. (stating that information
obtained during the representation of a client may not later be used against that client); MODEL
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2. Rating: 1. This choice is the more restrictive choice because the
lawyer is taking no risks of having a conflict of interest, being charged
with a conflict of interest, or having a conflict of interest arise sometime
during the sexual abuse litigation." One example of a risk that the
lawyer could face is if the husband later lies about or attempts to
conceal his assets, the lawyer could face a confidentiality problem if that
lawyer attempts to find those assets."'
Dilemma II:
1. Rating: 1. This choice is possibly permissible, ethically, but
involves more risk than Choice 2 because the attorney is responsible for
keeping the secretary totally isolated from the case and must ensure that
she does not reveal any information inadvertently to anyone that could
circle back to the attorney or his secretary." The size of the law firm

RULES, supra note 288, Rule 1.9 cmt. 12 (same). Although no specific section of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility applies, several sections may indirectly apply. See MODEL
CODE, supra note 288, EC 4-6 (stating that a lawyer must preserve the confidences of former
clients and may not sell a law practice as an ongoing business because that would involve the
disclosure of client confidences); MODEL CODE EC 5-1 (stating that the interests of third parties
should not be "permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client"); MODEL CODE DR 5-105 (stating
that a lawyer must decline representation of a client if the interests of another client are likely
to impair the professional judgment of the lawyer).
300. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
301. See FLORIDA RULES Rule 1.6(a) & cmt. (stating that "a lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client" and that the confidentiality must be maintained
even for former clients); MODEL RULES 1.6(a) & cmt. 21 (same); MODEL CODE, supra note 288,
EC 4-6 ('The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client
continues after the termination of his employment."); MODEL CODE DR 4-101(A) (stating a
lawyer must not only keep confidential matters protected by the attorney-client privilege, but
also "other information gained in the professional relationship" between the lawyer and the
client).
302. Nothing in the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, or the Model Code of Professional Responsibility is exactly on point. These ethical
codes only to lawyers and not to secretaries. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 41.10(b) (stating that a firm may not represent a client if any of the lawyers in that firm could
not represent that client); MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule 1.10(b) (same); MODEL CODE,
supra note 288, DR 5-105(D) (stating that if a lawyer is not allowed to represent a client, then
none of his partners or associates may represent that client). Only with a strained reading do the
rules regarding nonlawyer assistants apply because these rules primarily deal with the present
conduct of the assistant. See FLORIDA RULES Rule 4-5.3(c) (stating that the conduct of a
nonlawyer assistant will be imputed to a lawyer only if the conduct violates the rules and either
(1) the lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct or (2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm or has
direct supervisory authority over the assistant); MODEL RULES Rule 5.3(c) (same); but see
MODEL CODE DR 4-101(D) (stating a lawyer should prevent his employees from disclosing or
using the confidences and secrets of a client). Another potential problem that the lawyer may
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matters; he could not build an adequate Chinese Wall if his firm was
tiny (e.g., three lawyers) but would be easier to maintain in a larger
firm. Although this choice may be unethical in many cases, because of
the size of the firm, this choice is in the gray area.0 3
2. Rating: 2. Withdrawing is the most restrictive choice, even
though Choice 1 may be permissible under the code of legal ethics.
Withdrawing is also consistent with the ethical code, but involves less
risk of malpractice or ethical violation or of having the Chinese Wall be
faulty.3" Attorneys are bound to avoid even the appearance of impropriety and the Chinese Wall with continuing representation has elements
of possible impropriety or the air of impropriety.0" One case found
that, because the lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety, building a Chinese Wall is not appropriate or practical in such a
situation, thus withdrawal is appropriate."
3. Rating: 0. This is the least ethical, because the lawyer is taking
no precautions to not use, in the lawyer's representation of the plaintiff,
privileged information the secretary received as the employee of the
defense counsel. He could easily acquire privileged information from the
secretary and use it against the defendant, which may be unethical.3

face is that the lawyer "may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate
the client's cause or endeavor." FLORIDA RULES Rule 4-1.3 cmt.; MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt.
1; see also MODEL CODE EC 7-1 (requiring a lawyer to represent a client zealously); MODEL
CODE EC 7-9 (stating if a lawyer feels that an action would be unjust, then the lawyer must ask
his client for permission to forgo that action if the action would be in the best interests of the
client). A final concern, is that even though the firm is not using the information from the
secretary, there is likely to be an appearance of impropriety. See MODEL CODE EC 9-6 (stating
a lawyer has a duty to avoid even the appearance of impropriety); but see MODEL RULES Rule
1.9 cmt. 5 (stating that the appearance of impropriety standard was too broad because too many
actions could be viewed as unethical under that standard).
303. See MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule 1.9 cmt. 7 ("Preserving confidentiality is a
question of access to information."). However, creating a Chinese Wall is probably not a good
idea because it may be impractical or even impossible to build an adequate Chinese Wall.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 302-03.
305. See supra note 302.
306. A.B.A. & B.N.A., supra note 296, at 901:1058 (citing General Counsel of Alabama,
Formal Op. 89-81 (Aug. 7, 1989)). This case required withdrawal of representation. Id. (citing
MODEL CODE, supra note 288, DR 4-101).
307. See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
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Dilemma IV."

1. Rating: 0. This choice is conservative in the sense that the attorney is taking no risks by withdrawing representation, but she is also
potentially prejudicing her client's case by withdrawing right before
trial."° The client will not receive adequate representation from
another attorney that he hires on the day of the trial.
2. Rating: 1. This choice is arguably ethical because the attorney
must have more than a reasonable belief that his client is lying-he
must have actual knowledge of the deception or some corroborating
evidence of the deception before he must mandatorily withdraw."'
However, this choice is risky and is not ideal because the lawyer has
reason to believe the client will perjure himself at trial and should not
rely on the fact that the client denies he is lying. He will be in trouble
ethically if the client actually does perjure himself at trial and it is later
"'
discovered.31

308. This dilemma is based on a hypothetical found in educational materials prepared by
the American Bar Association. A.B.A. SPECIAL COORD. COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, ABA
ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND PROFESSIONALISM:

A STUDY

GUIDE FOR THE VIDEO PROGRAM (1990)

(available from the A.B.A.: Center for Professional Responsibility, 541 North Fairbanks Court,
Chicago, IL 60611-3314).
309. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-1.16(d) (stating that when a lawyer
withdraws from representation, the lawyer must take reasonable steps to protect the client's
interests); MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule 1.16(d) (same); MODEL CODE, supra note 288,
DR 2-110(A)(2) (stating a lawyer shall not withdraw until the lawyer has taken reasonable steps
to insure the client is not prejudiced by the withdrawal). Additionally, a representative from The
Florida Bar's Ethics Hotiine said that withdrawing in such a manner is probably unethical.
Telephone Interview with Timothy Chinaris of The Florida Bar's Ethics Hotline (June 19, 1991).
310. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-1.16(a) to (b) (stating that the lawyer
must withdraw if the lawyer knows "the representation will result in violation of the [r]ules;"
otherwise the lawyer may withdraw only if "withdrawal can be accomplished without material
adverse effect on the interests of the client"); MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule 1.16(a)-(b)
(same); MODEL CODE, supra note 288, DR 2-110 (stating that as long as reasonable steps are
taken to insure the client is not prejudiced, the lawyer must withdraw if "he knows or it is
obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a [d]isciplinary [r]ule" and may
withdraw if the lawyer's "continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a
[d]isciplinary (riule"); but see MODEL CODE DR 2-110(C)(1)(e) (stating that if a client is asking
a lawyer to engage in conduct contrary to the judgment of the lawyer but not actually prohibited
by the [d]isciplinary [r]ules, the lawyer may not withdraw if the matter is pending before a
tribunal). Additionally, according to a representative of The Florida Bar's Ethics Hotline, such
a withdrawal would be unethical under Florida case law. Telephone Interview with Timothy
Chinaris of The Florida Bar's Ethics Hotline (June 19, 1991).
311. See FLORIDA RULES, supra note 288, Rule 4-3.3 (stating that a lawyer shall not
evidence that he knows to be false and if the lawyer later discovers that material evidence the
lawyer presented was false, then the lawyer must take remedial measures); MODEL RULES, supra
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3. Rating: 2. This choice is the most ethical because the attorney
is not prejudicing the client's case by withdrawing the day before trial
and yet she is not collaborating in perjury. She is refusing to overlook
the client's dishonesty, while still protecting his interests.1 2
313
Dilemma V:

1. & 2. Rating: 1. These two choices are only half-ethical in that
the attorney has only fulfilled half of his ethical responsibilities.
Reporting only to the client or only to the bar association is each only
half of the attorney's duty-he is required to report to both.314 Thus,
these two are equally restrictive, but less restrictive than Choice 3 and
Choice 6.

note 288, Rule 3.3 (same); MODEL CODE, supra note 288, DR 1-102 (stating that a lawyer shall
not engage in conduct involving misrepresentation); MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(3) (stating that
a lawyer shall not conceal information that he required by law to disclose); MODEL CODE DR
7-102(A)(4) (stating that a lawyer shall not offer perjured testimony or false evidence). The
lawyer later could be faced with conflicting ethical obligations because the lawyer may be
required to disclose the perjury of his client and be obligated to preserve the confidences of his
client. See supra note 299-300 and accompanying text (discussing client confidentiality); but see
MODEL CODE EC 4-2 (stating that a lawyer may disclose client confidences when permitted by
the [d]isciplinary [r]ules or required by law).
312. See supra notes 299-300, 309-11 and accompanying text.
313. This dilemma was based on A.B.A. & B.N.A., supra note 296, at 901:2063-64 (citing
Connecticut Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 89-21 (July 28, 1989)). The Connecticut
ethics commission determined that a lawyer was ethically obligated to report to the client and
to the bar association the actions of his partner. Id. See generally Joanne Pitulla, Firm
Commitments: Lawyers Cannot Ignore Duty to Report Ethics Violations by Colleagues, 81
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, 108, 108 (discussing why lawyers should report their colleagues
misconduct).
314. The actions of the partner clearly constitute misconduct because even if the actions
were not criminal, they were certainly deceitful, dishonest, and fraudulent. FLORIDA RULES,
supra note 288, Rule 4-8.4; MODEL RULES, supra note 288, Rule 8.4; MODEL CODE, supra note
288, DR 1-102(A); see MODEL CODE EC 6-6, DR 6-102 (stating a lawyer shall not attempt to
limit that lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice). The lawyer is obligated to report this
misconduct to the bar because the partner's acts raise "a substantial question as to that lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer." FLORIDA RULES Rule 4-8.3 & cmt. ("Reporting
a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense."); MODEL
RULES Rule 8.3 & cmt. 1 (same); see MODEL CODE DR-103 (stating that a lawyer having
unprivileged knowledge of a violation of the disciplinary rules must report the knowledge to the
appropriate authority). Because of the partnership, because the lawyer is aware of the conduct,
the lawyer is required to take "reasonable remedial action." FLORIDA RULES Rule 4-5.1 (c)(2);
MODEL RULES Rule 5.1(c)(2). Thus, the lawyer is probably obligated to report the misconduct
to the client. See FLORIDA RULES Rule 4-1.4(a) ("A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter .... ."); MODEL RULES Rule 1.4(a) (same); MODEL CODE
EC 9-2 (stating that a lawyer should inform a client of material developments).
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3. Rating: 2. This choice fulfills the two ethical obligations to the
client and to the bar association,"'5 so it is more ethical than Choices
1 and 2, but the attorney is not taking the most conservative route
because she is not
allowing the wrongdoing attorney to have a chance
316
to "come clean.
4. & 5. Rating: 0. These are equally rated because in neither case
has the attorney fulfilled any of his ethical responsibilities. He has failed
two ethical duties. Talking to his former partner is a nice idea, but is
completely of no effect, because the former partner can simply ignore
the attorney's suggestions to "come clean." Doing nothing is obviously
similarly unethical and ineffective. 17
6. Rating: 3. This choice is the most ethical because the ethics code
requires that the attorney report to both the client and the bar association." Contacting the wrongdoing lawyer is not required but is more
conservative than not contacting him, so this is a more conservative
choice than Choice 3.

315. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
316. See MODEL CODE, supra note 288, EC 1-5 (stating a lawyer should encourage fellow
lawyers to maintain high standards of ethical conduct).
317. See MODEL CODE, supra note 288, EC 1-4 (stating that the integrity of the profession
can be maintained only if the misconduct of lawyers is reported); see also supra note 314 and
accompanying text (stating that the lawyer is required to report his partner).
318. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
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